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BOOK REVIEW ESSAY 
THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS: WHAT ABORTION 
TEACHES US ABOUT AMERICAN POUTICS 
ABORTION AND AMERICAN POLITICS. By Barbara Hinkson Craig 
and David M. O'Brien. Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publish-
ers, Inc., 1993. Pp. xvi, 382. $30.00. 
Reviewed by Neal Devins* 
Roe v. Wade1 '\vas designed to help put an end to the abortion dis-
pute. Justice Harry Blackmun put forth a trimester test governing state 
authority over the abortion decision both to make clear what the Court 
intended and to foreclose future governmental efforts to sidestep the 
Court's decision.2 Over objections by Justice Potter Stewart that the draft 
opinion was "inflexibly 'legislative,' "3 Blackmun nonetheless persisted in 
his efforts to clarify the reaches and limits of governmental authority in 
this area. 
Twenty-one years later, the abortion wars rage on, and Blackmun's 
belief that Roe might settle the issue seems to have been-to put it 
mildly-hopelessly naive. What Blackmun did not take into account was 
the inevitable backlash from elected government at both the state and 
federal levels. "UJudges,'' as Blackmun's newest colleagne Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg has written, "play an interdependent part in our democracy. They 
do not alone shape legal doctrine but ... they participate in a dialogue 
with other organs of government, and with the people as well."4 Indeed, 
Ginsburg went so far as to suggest in December 1992 that Roe "prolonged 
divisiveness and deferred stable settlement of the [abortion] issue" by 
short-circuiting early, 1970s legislative reform efforts.5 Although Justice 
Ginsburg overstates her claim,6 there is no doubt that Roe is a point of 
* Professor of Law, Lecturer in Government, College of William and Mary. Thanks 
to Laura Brill and Wendy Watson for their help and encouragement. 
1. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). . 
2. The trimester test rejected state regulation of abortion during the first trimester of 
a pregnancy, approved reasonable state regulation during the second trimester, and 
authorized the prohibition of third trimester abortions. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 
163-65. 
3. See Bob Woodward, The Abortion Papers, Wash. Post, Jan. 22, 1989, at D1, D2. 
4. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1185, 1198 
(1992) (emphasis added). 
5. 1d. at 1208. 
6. See David Ga1Tow, History Lesson for the Judge: What Clinton's Supreme Court 
Nominee Doesn't Know About !We, Wash. Post, June 20, 1993, at C3 (arguing that 
although liberalization forces had scored a series of dramatic breakthroughs between 1967 
C)Q~ 
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departure, not a point of termination, in studying the constitutionality of 
abortion.7 
A simple comparison of elected branch interest in abortion before 
and after Roe makes clear that the abortion dispute is not controlled by 
nine individuals working in isolation. Prior to Roe, abortion was a matter 
of some state and limited national attention. In the decade preceding 
Roe, after nearly a century of political dormancy, four states repealed and 
nineteen states-while still limiting abortion rights-liberalized their 
abortion laws. 8 Congress and the White House, for the most part, were 
content to leave the abortion issue in the hands of state government: 
congressional action was limited and designed to preserve the anti-abor-
tion status quo ante,9 while executive branch action was equally limited 
and typically reaffirmed state authority. to 
Elected government action since Roe makes clear that the Supreme 
Court's nationalization of abortion rights was anything but the last word 
on the subject. Over the past twenty years, the abortion dispute has 
spread throughout the American political system. Roe v. Wade and 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey11 notwithstanding, abortion is hardly the sole 
province of the judiciary. While abortion politics and court decision-mak-
ing are closely linked-especially through the nomination and confirma-
tion of federal judges-the sweep of abortion-related policy is far too 
broad for any one branch of government to dominate. 
The abortion drama demonstrates that the elected branches can in-
fluence the shaping of constitutional values in many ways. The executive 
branch has been extremely active in its attempts to regulate abortion. 
Presidential appointments to courts and government agencies, the use of 
constitutionally specified powers to recommend as well as veto legislation, 
and 1970, the emergence of powerful right-to-life forces in 1970 and 1971 resulted in an 
all-but-complete deadlock on abortion liberalization in state legislatures). 
7. For commentary depicting Roe as the beginning of a dialogue, see Mark Tushnet, 
Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law 153 (1988); Barry 
Friedman, Dialogue andjudicial Review, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 577, 658-68 (1993); see also 
Stephen L. Carter, The Morgan "Power" and the Forced Reconsideration of Constitutional 
Decisions, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 819, 821-24 (1986) (using Roe to support the argument that 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), permits Congress to engage the Supreme 
Court in a dialogue). 
8. See Eva R Rubin, Abortion, Politics, and the Courts: Roe v. Wade and Its Mtermath 
20-24 (rev. ed. 1987); Austin Sarat, Abortion and the Courts: Uncertain Boundaries of 
Law and Politics in American Politics and Public Policy 113, 125-27 (Allan P. Sindler ed., 
1982). 
9. By including abortion restrictions in a handful of family planning and health-
related bills, Congress simply honored 46 states' abortion legislation. 
10. In 1971, for example, the Nixon administration restricted the performance of 
abortion in military hospitals to bases located in states with legalized abortion. This 
episode is discussed in Lee Epstein & Joseph F. Kobylka, The Supreme Court and Legal 
Change: Abortion and the Death Penalty 154 (1992). 
11. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (affirming right to abortion but replacing trimester 
standard with undue burden test). 
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and the exercise of symbolic leadership through bully pulpit speeches all 
figure prominendy in the abortion dispute. Furthermore, federal depart-
ments and agencies involved in health and family planning, civil rights, 
foreign policy, and the budget have all found themselves in the midst of 
the abortion controversy.12 Congress and its committees have also been 
vigorous players in the abortion dispute. Through its roles both as 
lawmaker and overseer of government agencies and departments, Con-
gress is continuously involved in shaping and limiting abortion rights. 
Abortion, finally, is not simply about federal decision-making. A vig-
orous dialogue has emerged between state legislatures and the federal 
courts. State legislatures regularly enact, review, and modify laws gov-
erning such areas as pre-abortion counseling, waiting periods, and juve-
nile and spousal rights. 1n conjunction with Congress, the White House, 
and the states, interest groups are also actively involved in this political 
dynamic. Pro-life forces, for example, played a prominent role in the 
election of Ronald Reagan and have been active participants in the craft-
ing of anti-abortion legislation and regulation.13 Pro-choice forces have 
also come to understand the pivotal role played by political action, with 
the American Civil Liberties Union and National Abortion Rights Action 
League both calling Congress the "'court oflast resort.'"14 
The volume of post-Roe elected branch initiatives is truly remark-
able.15 Irrespective of one's views of elected government's efforts, the 
abortion dispute clearly provides a revealing glimpse into the workings of 
American political institutions. Although elected branch interpretation 
figures prominendy in all areas of constitutional decision-making, 16 abor-
12. These departments and agencies include the Department of Justice, Surgeon 
General, National Institutes for Health, Food and Drug Administration, Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, Civil Rights Commission, Department of State, 
U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Defense, Civil Service 
Commission, and Office of Management and Budget. The United States' delegation to the 
United Nations is also involved in the abortion controversy. See generally infra notes 
45-79. 
13. See Michele McKeegan, Abortion Politics: Mutiny in the Ranks of the Right 1-46 
(1992). 
14. Louis Fisher & Neal Devins, Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law 7 (1992) 
(quoting from a statement entitled "Supreme Court Alert" which was distributed by the 
National Abortion Rights Action League on June 27, 1991); W. John Moore, ln Whose 
Court? 23 Nat'IJ. 2396, 2400 (1991) (quoting Leslie A. Harris, chieflegislative counsel in 
Washington for the American Civil Liberties Union). 
15. Admittedly, since much of abortion politics centers on legislative proposals that 
are never enacted and regulatory initiatives that are repealed whenever there is a change 
of administration, it is possible to describe abortion politics as a controversy where "[r ]arely 
have so many public officials worked so hard to say so little about an issue on the minds of 
so many citizens." Amy Gutmann, No Common Ground, New Republic, Oct. 22, 1990, at 
43, 43 (book review). Nonetheless, although the volume of legislation and regulation 
seems disproportionately low in relation to the amount of effort invested, many laws have 
been enacted and regulations put into effect. 
16. Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation as Political Process 231-74 
(1988); See Fisher & Devins, supra note 14, at 1-26; Symposium, Elected Branch 
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tion is indisputably the perfect candidate for a comprehensive examina-
tion of the role played by nonjudicial forces in the shaping of 
constitutional values. 
Political scientists Barbara Hinkson Craig and David M. O'Brien have 
recently undertaken this taskP Their Abortion and American Politics is eas-
ily the most comprehensive accounting of federal and state abortion poli-
tics to date. Remarkable as it may sound, Craig and O'Brien's study is the 
first book-length survey of elected branch participation in the abortion 
dispute.18 Other works on this subject have sought either to juggle abor-
tion politics with other concerns or have limited their sights to a select 
number of abortion politics topics.19 Abortion and American Politics there-
fore addresses a surprisingly large gap in this literature. Craig and 
O'Brien's study is also well timed. With Congress, the courts, the Clinton 
administration, and the states currently embroiled in a broad range of 
abortion disputes, a comprehensive account of this subject is especially 
valuable. Furthermore, since the abortion wars have raged for more than 
twenty years, conclusions can be drawn about the style and impact of 
elected branch participation. 
Constitutional Interpretation, 56 Law & Contemp. Probs. (Neal Devins ed., forthcoming 
1993). 
17. Craig and O'Brien are both well known for studies on the political nature of 
constitutional decision-making. Craig's Chadha: The Story of an Epic Constitutional 
Struggle (1988) details how political and judicial actors both contributed to the Supreme 
Court's legislative veto decision. O'Brien's Storm Center: The Supreme Court in 
American Politics (1990) highlights the political nature and inner workings of Supreme 
Court decision-making. 
18. Eva Rubin's 1987 Abortion, Politics, and the Courts, which examines federal and 
state abortion politics both before and after !We, is principally concerned with court 
decision-making. Rubin's discussion of the state legislative response to !We, for example, 
focuses on post-/We adjudication and not the politics surrounding post-/We legislative 
repeal efforts. See Rubin, supra note 8, at 117-49. 
19. Abortion politics is typically featured as one of several examples of elected branch 
constitutional interpretation. See Susan R. Burgess, Contest for Constitutional Authority: 
The Abortion and War Powers Debates (1991); Epstein & Kobylka, supra note 10; Fisher & 
Devins, supra note 14; Edward Keynes & Randall K. Miller, The Court vs. Congress: Prayer, 
Busing, and Abortion (1989); Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring 
About Social Change (1991). Books focusing on the abortion dispute, moreover, have 
limited their examination of abortion politics to a period of time or subtopic or have 
incorporated their discussion of abortion politics into a broader consideration of the 
propriety of !We. See, e.g., The Abortion Dispute and the American System (Gilbert Y. 
Steiner ed., 1983) (highly selective compilation which does not systematically consider 
Congress, White House, or state role); Marian Faux, Roe v. Wade: The Untold Story of the 
Landmark Supreme Court Decision that Made Abortion Legal (1988) (focus on !We case); 
Frederick S. Jaffee et al., Abortion Politics: Private Morality and Public Policy (1981) 
(focus on abortion as social policy issue); Kristin Luker, Abortion and the Politics of 
Motherhood (1984) (focus on interest groups, not elected government action); 
McKeegan, supra note 13 (focus on "New Right" attacks on /We);James C. Mohr, Abortion 
in America: The Origins and Evolution of National Policy, 1800-1900 (1978) (focus on 
nineteenth-century policy development); Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of 
Absolutes (1990) (abortion politics balanced with normative concerns). 
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Abortion and American Politics aims high. Recognizing that "the poli-
tics of the abortion controversy has affected every branch and every level 
of American government" (p. xiii), Craig and O'Brien set out to "use the 
abortion controversy as an illustrative portrait, even if in some ways a dis-
appointing reflection, of the American governmental and political pro-
cess" (p. xv). In unveiling this portrait, Craig and O'Brien steadfastly 
refuse to present an argument in support of either side of the abortion 
debate. Other than demonstrating that "decisions on highly controver-
sial matters are rarely final" but instead "are subject to challenge, evasion, 
and overturning" (pp. xiv-xv), Abortion and American Politics is intended to 
be a purely descriptive presentation. Craig and O'Brien opt for this 
value-neutral approach so that their conclusions on the American polit-
ical system will not be tainted by their personal beliefs (p. xv). 
In many ways, Abortion and American Politics is highly successful in ac-
complishing its self-described task. The book is a thorough, accessible, 
and even-handed introduction to the multifarious modes through which 
elected government at both the state and federal levels has tackled the 
abortion issue. The book chronicles, in varying degrees of detail, the 
principal initiatives of pro-choice and pro-life forces, including legislative 
debates and hearings, court filings and arguments, and regulatory 
action.20 
Abortion and American Politics is best viewed as an introduction to 
political institutions through the abortion dispute. Chapters are some-
times built around critical players (Congress, the White House, states, 
and interest groups) and sometimes around pivotal events (Supreme 
Court decisions in Roe, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 21 and Casey). 
Craig and O'Brien make good use of this hybrid format. Their recount-
ing offers the benefits of an institutional focus with compelling narrative 
force. Abortion and American Politics is unquestionably an important and 
valuable addition to the burgeoning literature on the propriety and 
sweep of elected branch constitutional interpretation. 22 
Despite its many virtues, however, Abortion and American Politics is a 
work of limited value. Craig and O'Brien draw no conclusions about 
what abortion politics reveals about American political institutions (or, 
20. During the period beginning with the !We decision and ending with the election 
of Bill Clinton, the bulk of these initiatives were pro-life efforts designed to curtail abortion 
rights. Consequently, Abortion and American Politics-which is current up to the first 
month or two of the Clinton administration-is principally a book about the reaches and 
limits of pro-life attempts to curtail !We v. Wade and its progeny. Pro-choice efforts, for the 
most part, are described-as they should be-as attempts to defend !We from pro-life 
attacks. 
21. 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (approving second trimester viability testing and, with it, 
calling into question the !We trimester standard). 
22. See sources cited supra notes 7, 16 and 19. See also Ira C. Lupu, Statutes 
Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1993) (analyzing issues raised by 
statutes that "utilize the language of the Constitution itself, or ... the language of judicial 
gloss on the Constitution"). 
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conversely, what American political institutions tell us about abortion 
politics). The authors' sole objective, instead, is to demonstrate that 
political actors, as well as courts, shape abortion rights. This proposition 
is sufficiently obvious that its proof is hardly ground breaking. Craig and 
O'Brien do not discuss issues such as the quality of elected branch consti-
tutional interpretation, the choice of elected branch responses, the pre-
dominance of White House or congressional influences, and elected 
branch attitudes toward the judiciary. Consequently, instead of meeting 
head on their stated objective of using the abortion controversy to "[un-
derstand] the American governmental and political process" (p. xv), the 
authors' unwillingness to communicate some lesson beyond a simple re-
counting of events makes Abortion and American Politics less provocative 
and less durable than it might be. 
The book, for example, provides no analytical framework with which 
to assess the dramatic change in federal abortion politics spurred on by 
the advent of the Clinton administration. Prior to Bill Clinton's election, 
no administration supported Roe, and most administrations actively op-
posed it. Today, pro-choice initiatives have moved into the political fore-
front. Aside from historical background, Abortion and American Politics is 
uninstructive in explaining why efforts to enact the Freedom of Choice 
Act23 stalled and abortion funding restrictions persist. 
The failure of Abortion and American Politics to offer any guidance on 
how to assess the factors that affect elected government action, or on the 
quality and impact of elected branch constitutional interpretations, is 
truly unfortunate. Craig and O'Brien have skillfully amassed an ex-
traordinary amount of information only to place the burden on the 
reader to figure out the significance of their facts. This review will at-
tempt to help fill the gap by offering a more cohesive and far-ranging 
analysis of the power that governmental institutions wield in shaping 
abortion and other constitutional controversies. Part I will follow Craig 
and O'Brien's lead and demonstrate how abortion politics illuminates 
the numerous ways in which elected government can shape constitutional 
values. The examples used, for the most part, will be taken from Abortion 
and American Politics. Craig and O'Brien, however, do not seek to bring 
together these examples to offer a summary statement on elected branch 
influences. Part I serves as such a statement. Part ll will extend the les-
sons of Abortion and American Politics. Issues considered include the rea-
sons why elected government regularly makes use of some but not all of 
its powers to shape constitutional disputes; the seriousness with which the 
elected branches engage in constitutional interpretation; the impact of 
abortion politics on political institutions; and elected government atti-
tudes toward the judiciary. The Conclusion, finally, will offer some 
thoughts on the future of abortion politics. 
23. H.R 25, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES 
299 
Each and every feature of the abortion dispute is dominated by 
elected government action. Before a case comes to court, Congress or 
the states must enact a law or the executive branch must promulgate a 
regulation. Once a case is in court, the states, the Justice Department, 
and Congressional coalitions-sometimes as parties and sometimes as 
amici curiae-inform the judiciary of their views. Mter a case is adjudi-
cated, elected government may seek to expand or limit the holding 
through a number of techniques ranging from the interpretation of the 
judicial ruling to the nullification of the ruling through constitutional 
amendment. Through the appointments-confirmation process, more-
over, the President and Senate control the composition of the federal 
bench. 
Nothing about the above inventory of elected branch influences is 
unique to the abortion debate. Issues such as school desegregation, wo-
men in the military, fiag burning, war powers, search and seizure, and the 
legislative veto follow a similar pattern. 24 What makes governmental con-
duct in the abortion dispute unique is the intensity of ~lected branch 
interest and the resulting evolution of an extraordinary portfolio of legis-
lative-executivejudicial dialogues. Through this portfolio of constitu-
tional dialogues, the abortion dispute serves as a lens through which to 
view the political dynamics of constitutional law. 
A Elected Government Participation in the Abortion Dispute 
1. Congress.- Abortion opponents, according to Craig and O'Brien, 
pursued "[v]irtually every possible legislative response" (p. 103) and, 
although "able to make significant progress" in stopping federal funding, 
were unable to "destroy[]" Roe v. Wade through congressional action (p. 
150). Abortion and American Politics offers persuasive evidence to support 
this contention. 
Congress has repeatedly shied away from taking an absolutist posi-
tion on abortion. It has rejected a proposed constitutional amendment 
overturning Roe as well as human life legislation defining the beginning 
of life as conception and specifYing that fetuses are persons for Four-
teenth Amendment purposes (pp. 137-45).25 These proposals would 
have done more than overturn Roe and return the abortion issue to the 
states. The specification of fetuses as legal persons was designed to pre-
vent states from permitting abortions unless the mother's life was in jeop-
ardy. Congress also rejected a more modest "federalism amendment" in 
1982 and again in 1983 that would have allowed states to regulate abor-
24. See sources cited supra notes 7, 16, 19 and 22. 
25. See infra notes 117-128 and accompanying text. 
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tion as they saw fit (pp. 146-47).26 Another example of this unwillingness 
to endorse extremist positions, although not mentioned in Abortion and 
American Politics, is Congress' repudiation of proposals to strip federal 
courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, of jurisdiction in abortion 
cases.27 These proposals would leave state courts free to follow, limit, or 
abandon Roe. Of all these measures, only the federalism amendment 
made it out of committee, but it was soundly defeated on the Senate floor 
(pp. 146-47). 
Congress has also rejected pro-choice absolutism. For example, in 
the wake of an endorsement in Planned Parenthood v. Casey of a qualified 
right to seek an abortion, legislators began backing away from efforts to 
codify abortion rights.28 In addition to pro-life legislators, pro-choice leg-
islators who endorse parental consent and waiting period restrictions ap-
pear unwilling to support the codification of Roe through the Freedom of 
Choice Act.29 Notwithstanding the Clinton administration's ostensible 
support for these codification efforts, 30 the Freedom of Choice Act has 
stalled and is unlikely to reemerge in the near future. 
Congress, as Craig and O'Brien suggest, is far more inclined to pass 
legislation limiting abortion funding than to restrict access to abortion by 
more direct means. Starting in 1976 with the Hyde Amendment, Con-
gress has barred the use of Medicaid funds for most abortions (pp. 
110-37).31 Congress has also used its appropriations powers to set abor-
tion-related restrictions on programs involving family planning, foreign 
aid, legal services, military hospitals, the Bureau of Prisons,32 and the 
Peace Corps (pp. 112-13, 131). The use of federal and local funds for 
abortions in the District of Columbia has also been limited by Congress 
(p. 1_13). 
26. SJ. Res. 110, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (a proposed amendment declaring no 
constitutional right to abortion and providing that more restrictive state abortion laws 
preempt less restrictive federal laws); SJ. Res. 3, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (proposed 
amendment declaring no constitutional right to abortion). See infra notes 117-118, 
123-126 and accompanying text. 
27. See infra notes 117-119, 123-126, 128. For a thorough description of Congress' 
authority to restrict court jurisdiction, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 164-77 
(1989). 
28. See Julie Rovner, Abortion Ruling Slows Momentum of Freedom of Choice Act, 
50 Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep. 1951 (1992). 
29. H.R. 25, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); see 1d. 
30. See Promises Kept on Abortion Policy, Chi. Trib.,Jan. 26, 1993, at 14; Brian Reilly, 
75,000 Protest Clinton's 'VISion': Pro-Lifers Renew Efforts After Pro-Choicer's Election, 
Wash. Times, Jan. 23, 1993, at AI. 
31. Pub. L. No. 94-439, 90 Stat. 1418 (1976) (applicable for fiscal year 1977). The 
precise terms of the Hyde Amendment change from year to year-sometimes allowing for 
abortions where the mother's life is in jeopardy, other times providing funds for the 
victims of rape and incest, and one year authorizing the funding of abortions when there is 
a risk of severe and long-lasting physical health damage to the pregnant woman (p. 124). 
Despite its apparent receptiveness to funding prohibitions, Congress has flatly and 
repeatedly declined to enact a permanent Hyde Amendment. 
32. 132 Cong. Rec. H4583 (daily ed.July 17, 1986). 
HeinOnline -- 94 Colum. L. Rev.  301 1994
1994] ABORTION AND AMERICAN POIJTICS 301 
Congressional action extends beyond the adoption of funding re-
strictions and rejection of efforts to overrule &e. Congress has approved 
a handful of measures that affect abortion rights outside the context of 
federal funding prohibitions. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act,33 both 
by defining discrimination on the basis of pregnancy as sex discrimina-
tion and providing that employers may exempt abortions from health in-
surance benefits, lowers the relative cost for a woman to carry her 
pregnancy to term. Congress also undertook to encourage alternatives to 
abortion in its Adolescent Family Life Demonstration Projects.34 This 
legislation, better known as the "chastity act," enabled religious organiza-
tions to seek federal funds to promote sexual abstinence as a method of 
birth control among teenagers. Organizations, religious and otherwise, 
could not participate in the program if they engaged in abortion 
counseling. 
Congressional action, however, is not always hostile to abortion 
rights. Following the Supreme Court's 1991 approval in Rust v. Sullivan35 
of regulations prohibiting federally funded family planning programs 
from mentioning abortion, Congress sought to nullify the regulations36 
(only to be thwarted by a presidential veto). Craig and O'Brien, while 
making note of this episode (pp. 311-15), barely touch on Congress' 
power to expand abortion rights. Furthermore, Congress' willingness to 
protect abortion rights with legislation appears on the rise. Five months 
after Clinton took over the White House, Congress enacted the National 
Institutes of Health Revitalization A~t of 1993,37 reversing a Reagan and 
Bush era moratorium on federally funded research that uses aborted fetal 
tissue. Congress also appears set to enact the Freedom of Access to Clinic 
Entrances Act of 1993,38 nullifying the Supreme Court's 1993 decision in 
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,39 that existing federal civil rights 
legislation is not applicable to blockades of abortion clinics by Operation 
Rescue and other pro-life groups. Specifically, Freedom of Access legisla-
tion would prohibit the use or threat of force against a woman seeking an 
abortion or any individual assisting that woman. 
33. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076, 2076 (1980) (amending§ 701 of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964). Craig and O'Brien refer to this measure in a table of abortion-related 
legislation (p. 112), but do not discuss it further. 
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300z-10 (1988). Again, Craig and O'Brien refer to this measure in a 
table of abortion-related legislation, but do no more (p. 113). For further discussion, see 
infra text accompanying notes 107, 110-114. 
35. 111 S. Ct.l759, 1771-78 (1991). 
36. Characterizing the regulations' denial of "quality health care" to "low income 
pregnant women" as "bizarre and cruel," Congress approved a rider prohibiting federal 
funding of the regulations. John H. Chafee, Congress Should Remedy the Court's 
Decision, Wash. Post, June 7, 1991, at A23. 
37. Pub. L. No. 10343, § 113, 107 Stat. 122, 132 (1993); 42 U.S.C.A. § 289(g) (West 
Supp. 1993) (banning the use of fetal tissue in research); see infra notes 54-55 and 
accompanying text. 
38. H.R. 796, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1993). 
39. 113 S. Ct. 753, 758-62 (1993). 
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Congress also participates in the abortion dispute through the use of 
its powers outside of lawmaking. Craig and O'Brien make brief mention 
of some of these legislative influences, although they treat these matters 
as ancillary to the powers of other branches. Their chapters on presiden-
tial politics and post-Webster national politics, for example, refer to the 
Senate's role in confirming judicial nominees as part of a presidentially 
dominated appointments process (pp. 173--85, 316-21). A larger discus-
sion of interest group participation in Supreme Court litigation (pp. 207, 
225) also makes note of congressional participation in litigation.40 
These congressional powers deserve more focused attention. Since 
the 1981 nomination of Sandra Day O'Connor, the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee has made a nominee's views on abortion the sine qua non of the 
confirmation process. This singlemindedness figured largely in the de-
feat of Robert Bork. More significandy, the fixation of both the Judiciary 
Committee and interest groups on the abortion dispute may have con-
tributed to Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter's affirming the "cen-
tral holding of Roe" in Casey.41 
Another phenomenon deserving more focused attention is how Con-
gress seeks to shape constitutional doctrine through its participation in 
litigation. When the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
Hyde Amendment in Harris v. McRae,42 for example, a bipartisan coali-
tion of over 200 congressional amici argned that "[t]o tamper with [the 
inviolable and exclusive power of the purse] is to tamper with the very 
essence of constitutional, representative government."43 In recent years, 
pro-choice and pro-life legislators have lined up on opposite sides of state 
regulation cases. These filings, although principally symbolic, are none-
theless instructive in measuring legislative attitudes. In Thornburgh v. 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,44 eighty-one pro-choice 
legislators publicly scolded Solicitor General Charles Fried for having 
"taken an extraordinary and unprecedented step" in calling for Roe's 
reversal. 45 
40. Through two tables comparing Senators signing "pro-choice" and "anti-abortion" 
briefs in 1985 and 1989, Craig and O'Brien adeptly demonstrate how pro-choice legislators 
proved much more willing to defend abortion rights when RJJe appeared vulnerable (10 in 
1985; 25 ·in 1989), while pro-life legislators' willingness to advocate RJJe's reversal remained 
stable (12 in 1985; 15 in 1989) (pp. 207, 225). 
41. See Stephen S. Wermeil, Confirming the Constitution, 56 Law & Con temp. Probs. 
142 (1993). 
42. 448 u.s. 297, 312-20, 321-26 (1980). 
43. Brief of Rep. Jim Wright et al. at 14, Harris, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (No. 79-1268) 
[hereinafter Brief of jim Wright]. 
44. 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (striking down informed consent and reporting requirements 
as well as demand that two physicians be present during abortion procedure), overruled in 
part by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
45. Brief of Sen. Bob Packwood et al. at 3, Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (No. 
84-495). 
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A few aspects of Congress' involvement in the abortion dispute are 
not considered in Abortion and American Politics. The confirmation pro-
cess, of course, extends to executive branch officials as well as Article III 
judges. Starting with the Carter administration, presidential appointees 
for such positions as Secretary of Health and Human Services, Surgeon 
General, Attorney General, Solicitor General, and Director of the Office 
of Personnel Management have come to the Senate with a track record 
on the abortion issue. The Senate grants the President great leeway in 
executive branch appointments. Although the Senate will explore the 
nominee's personal views on abortion and how those views will affect her 
management of government resources, abortion is not a litmus test issue. 
Charles Fried, who had filed a brief calling for Roe's reversal prior to 
Reagan's nominating him as Solicitor General, spoke of being "surprised 
by how pleasant and interesting the [courtesy call] meetings with the most 
liberal Democratic Senators-Kennedy, Metzenbaum, Simon-turned 
out to be."46 Nonetheless, the Senate uses these hearings to make nomi-
nees well aware of the high-stakes nature of abortion politics. Joseph 
Califano, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare under Carter, put 
it this way: "[Following a round of questioning about abortion,] [ t] he ten-
sion.in the room eased a little as other senators asked questions on Social 
Security, balancing the budget, eliminating paperwork, busing, race dis-
crimination, [etc.]."47 
Another topic not addressed by Craig and O'Brien is how Congress 
participates in the abortion dispute through its oversight of governmental 
programs. When the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights published a report 
advocating abortion rights in 1975, Congress expressed its displeasure 
·with the agency by forbidding future studies on this issue. 48 Congress 
likewise used its oversight powers to express its dissatisfaction with the 
Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) treatment of Combined Fed-
eral Campaign contributions to Planned Parenthood. OPM, then 
headed by pro-life activist Donald Devine, excluded Planned Parenthood 
from the list of approved charities that federal employees could donate to 
through a payroll deduction. Following a series of court decisions, in-
cluding a Supreme Court decision49 suggesting that the Planned 
Parenthood exclusion might well be an impermissible attempt to snuff 
out a particular point ofview, Congress enacted legislation in 1985 block-
46. Charles Fried, Order and law: Arguing the Reagan Revolution-A Firsthand 
Account 36 (1991). 
47. Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Governing America 59 (1981). 
48. See Jaffee et al., supra note 19, at 57. Rather than criticize the substance of the 
Commission's arguments, Congress thought the Commission strayed too far from its 
statutory mandate in studying abortion rights. 
49. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n of America, Inc. v. Devine, No. 83-2118 (D.D.C. 
Sept. 14, 1983) (holding that Planned Parenthood could not arbitrarily be excluded from 
the Combined Federal Campaign). 
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ing the exclusion of advocacy groups from the Combined Federal 
Campaign. 5° 
In addition to the enactment of punitive legislation, congressional 
oversight also, and more typically, takes the form of legislative jawboning. 
When the Reagan administration suspended fetal tissue research, for ex-
ample, House Committee on Human Resources chair Ted Weiss re-
quested that the administration turn over all "research evidence" and "all 
documents, including letters, memoranda, minutes of meetings, and in-
ternal or draft documents. "51 Another example of congressional cajoling 
occurred when the Reagan administration announced its proposed regu-
lations on family planning programs. Congressional supporters, includ-
ing 106 co-signers of a letter of support to Health and Human Services 
Secretary Otis Bowen, encouraged the administration to stick to its guns 
and promulgate the regulations in final form.52 Opponents, in contrast, 
pleaded with the administration to suspend the regulations, accusing the 
administration of"succumb[ing] to political pressure" and describing the 
proposal as "not in the best interest of the 5,000,000 low income people 
that depend upon the program each year for family planning services."53 
2. The President. - The preeminence of the abortion issue in presi-
dential politics is tellingly revealed by the remarkable speed and vigor 
with which the Clinton administration put its pro-choice policies into ef-
fect. Having made campaign pledges to work for the enactment of the 
Freedom of Choice Act54 and to appoint federal judges "who believe ... 
[in] the constitutional right to privacy and the right to choose,"55 Clinton 
wasted little time in waving the pro-choice banner. On january 22, 1993, 
two days after his inauguration, Clinton dismantled the pro-life regula-
tory initiatives of the Reagan and Bush administrations. Speaking of our 
national "[goal] to protect individual freedom" and his vision "of an 
America where abortion is safe and legal, but rare," Clinton directed his 
Secretaries of Health and Human Services and Defense as well as the Ad-
ministrators of the Food and Drug Administration and U.S. Agency for 
International Development (AID) to rescind existing anti-abortion regu-
lations.56 As a result, the ban on fetal tissue research was lifted, limits on 
50. See 132 Cong. Rec. H2054 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 1986) (debate on supplemental 
appropriations of fiscal year 1986); McKeegan, supra note 13, at 48-52. 
51. Letter from Ted Weiss, Chairman, Human Resources and Intergovernmental 
Relations Subcommittee of the United States House of Representatives, to Louis Sullivan, 
M.D., Secretary, Department of Health and Human Resources (Nov. 13, 1989) (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review). 
52. See Fisher & Devins, supra note 14, at 223. 
53. Letter from Sen. Edward Kennedy to Otis Bowen, Secretary, of Health and 
Human Services (Oct. 30, 1987) (on file with the author). 
54. H.R 25, 102d Cong., 1st Sess (1991). 
55. Prime Time Live (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 29, 1992) (transcript on file with 
the Columbia Law Review). 
56. Remarks on Signing Memorandums on Medical Research and Reproductive 
Health and an Exchange with Reporters, 29 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 85 Qan. 25, 1993). 
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the ability of family planning programs to mention abortion were sus-
pended, privately funded abortions at military hospitals were permitted, 
the moratorium on the importation of the abortifacient RU-486 \vas sus-
pended, and limitations on the use of private funds by pro-choice organi-
zations that also receive AID funds were suspended.57 In the first six 
months of his administration, moreover, Clinton advanced his pro-choice 
agenda through legislative initiatives, court filings, and judicial appoint-
ments. During this time, Clinton supported abortion coverage in his na-
tional health care package and proposed a budget that did not include 
the Hyde Amendment and other abortion funding prohibitions. 5 8 In ad-
dition to supporting the Freedom of Choice Act, Clinton also stood be-
hind legislative efforts to guarantee access to abortion clinics and to fetal 
tissue for research. On the judicial front, Clinton told reporters that he 
had settled on Ruth Bader Ginsburg as his Supreme Court nominee "af-
ter he became convinced that she was 'clearly prochoice.'"59 Finally, 
before the Supreme Court, Clinton's Solicitor General argued that fed-
eral racketeering laws apply to the activities of Operation Rescue. 60 
The range and ferocity of Clinton administration action makes clear 
that the White House can be an active and somewhat one-sided partici-
pant in all phases of the abortion dispute. Focusing on Reagan adminis-
tration initiatives, Abortion and American Politics reaches the same 
conclusion. Pointing to Reagan's efforts to advance his pro-life agenda 
through spiritual leadership, regulatory reform, judicial appointments 
and arguments, and legislative and constitutional amendment proposals, 
Craig and O'Brien argue that "the Reagan administration not only funda-
mentally changed the national debate over abortion but set the stage for 
how the controversy will play out in the 1990s" (p. 157). 
Before the election of Ronald Reagan, abortion was an important 
but not front burner issue for the executive. Prior to Roe, the White 
House saw abortion as a states' rights issue and left it alone. In the 1972 
election, for example, Richard Nixon spoke of"abortion [as] an unaccept-
able form of population control" (p. 158), but proposed no federal ac-
tion, while George McGovern made clear that he had "never advocated 
federal action to repeal [abortion] laws" and that, if elected, he "would 
take no such action" (p. 159). Mter Roe, abortion was too much on the 
national political agenda to be dismissed by the White House. The Ford 
administration, for example, could not help but confront questions re-
garding the eligibility of abortion under federal health care programs. In 
57. See id. at 85-86. 
58. See Stephen Barr, Abortion Coverage Proposed, Wash. Post, Apr. 6, 1993, atA-1. 
Clinton also proposed to allow federal employee health insurance plans to cover abortions. 
See id. 
59. Michael Kranish & Joel P. Engardio, Clinton Defends Methods, Boston Globe, 
June 16, 1993, § 3, at 1. 
60. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Nat'l Org. of Women v. 
Scheidler, (No. 92-780) (cert. granted June 14, 1993) (case pending) (interfering with 
abortion clinics does not violate RICO). 
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the 1976 election, moreover, Ford and Carter both sought out the Catho-
lic electorate by opposing public funding of abortion. 61 When Carter was 
elected, he justified the disproportionate burden that poor women suffer 
under the Hyde Amendment by observing that "there are many things in 
life that are not fair, that wealthy people can afford and poor people 
can't. "62 Neither Carter nor Ford played an activist role in the abortion 
dispute, however. Abortion did not figure prominently in their judicial 
appointments; neither asked the courts to either affirm or disavow Rne; 
legislation and constitutional amendments were not proposed; and regu-
latory initiatives were modest in scope and sweep. 
The 1980 election of Ronald Reagan changed all that. Indeed, to 
understand the range of options available to the executive one cannot 
help but focus-as Craig and O'Brien do-on the Reagan administra-
tion. Reagan campaigned on a platform that "support[ed] a constitu-
tional amendment to restore protection of the right to life for unborn 
children" and "support[ed] ... the Congressional efforts to restrict the 
use of taxpayers' dollars for abortion. "63 Once in office, as Reagan Solici-
tor General Charles Fried put it, "[t]he Reagan administration made Rne 
v. Wade the symbol of everything that had gone wrong in law, particularly 
in constitutionallaw."64 In Reagan's view, Rne v. Wade was as divisive and 
as wrong as Dred Scott. 65 
Reagan, as Craig and O'Brien note, was generally ineffective in his 
efforts to push through a pro-life legislative agenda (p. 172). With or 
without White House cheerleading, Congress was unwilling to approve a 
constitutional amendment restricting abortion rights, to enact a perma-
nent Hyde amendment, to prohibit federally funded family planning cen-
ters from referring pregnant women for abortions, or to statutorily define 
a fetus as a legal person. While the President was not able to push his 
legislative agenda through a reluctant Congress, Reagan effectively ad-
vanced his pro-life agenda on matters squarely within the executive's do-
main-judicial and administrative appointments, court filings, 
regnlation, and the power to veto or to approve legislation enacted by the 
Congress. 
Court filings and judicial appointments are the most direct ways by 
which the executive seeks to shape constitutional law and, not surpris-
ingly, Craig and O'Brien focus their efforts here. Reagan and his appoin-
tees spoke of judicial restraint and vigorously opposed "court create[d]" 
61. See Tribe, supra note 19, at 147-50. 
62. President's News Conference of July 12, 1977, Pub. Papers, 1977 (II}, at 1237. 
63. 1980 Republican Party Platform, reprinted in 36 Cong. Q. Almanac 58-B, 62-B 
(1980). 
64. Fried, supra note 45, at 72. 
65. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (holding that a Black 
American is not a citizen of a state as "citizen" is used in the federal constitution). On this 
point, see Reagan's remarkable Human Life Review article reprinted in Ronald Reagan, 
Abortion and the Conscience of the Nation 15 (1984). 
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privacy rights. 66 In advancing this judicial philosophy, the administration 
clearly heeded pro-life Senators and interest group concerns and, argua-
bly, gave these groups a veto over prospective nominees (p. 175). This 
strategy, more importantly, worked: "Reagan appointees were much 
more resistant to abortion rights than were the appointees of his prede-
cessors."67 The Reagan administration also advanced its judicial philoso-
phy through briefs and oral arguments before the lower federal courts 
and the Supreme Court (pp. 185-87). In many instances, the administra-
tion defended its regulatory agenda in court. In some instances (typically 
before the Supreme CoUrt), the administration appeared as an amicus to 
inform the Court of its views on state authority to regulate abortion. 
Reagan's first term Solicitor General Rex Lee, although falling short of 
asking the Court to overturn Roe, suggested that the Justices replace the 
trimester test with a more lenient undue burden standard.68 Reagan's 
second term Solicitor General Charles Fried took the plunge and argued 
that Roe was "'so far flawed and ... a source of such instability"' that it 
should be overturned (p. 186). 69 
The Reagan administration also reshaped abortion rights through its 
management of the administrative state. Abortion and American Politics dis-
cusses the most controversial of these regulatory initiatives, namely, the 
so-called "gag rule" ultimately upheld in Rust v. Sullivan.70 The story be-
gins in 1970 when Congress added to Title X a comprehensive family 
planning statute, an explicit prohibition against appropriating funds 
"where abortion is a method of family planning. "71 The Carter adminis-
tration interpreted the funding ban narrowly, mandating that Title X re-
cipients provide "non-directive counseling" on "pregnancy 
termination. "72 The Reagan administration vehemently opposed these 
66. According to his Assistant Attorney General in charge of judicial selections, 
Stephen Markman, "Reagan would have been derelict of his constitutional duty if he were 
to have appointed judges who were willing to create new constitutional 'rights' out of thin 
air." Stephen J. Markman, Judicial Selection: The Reagan Years, in Judicial Selection: 
Merit, Ideology, and Politics 33 (Henry Julian Abraham ed., 1990). 
67. Steve Alumbaugh & C. K. Rowland, The Links Between Platform-Based 
Appointment Criteria and Trial Judges' Abortion Judgments, 74 Judicature 153, 162 
(1990). 
68. On the trimester test, see supra note 2. The undue burden standard would 
approve state regulation of abortion that does not place an "undue burden" on a woman's 
decision to terminate her preguancy. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, 
City of Akron v. Akron Ct:r. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (No. 81-746). 
For further discussion, see infra note 153. 
69. Fried advanced this argument in Thornburgh v. American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986). (pp. 186-87). 
70. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). 
71. Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of1970, Title X,§ 1008, 84 
Stat. 1504, 1508 (1970). 
72. Program Guidelines for Project Grants for Family Planning Services, U.S. Dep't of 
Health & Human Services, Part II, 8.6 at 13 (1981). 
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regulations and ultimately elected to override the Carter scheme through 
its own regulatory initiatives.73 
The Supreme Court approved the Reagan scheme because "substan-
tial deference is accorded" to the executive in its interpretation of stat-
utes. 74 Craig and O'Brien discuss Rust but do not consider its 
implications (pp. 311-12, 331-32). As the varying approaches of the 
Carter and Reagan administrations reveal, the executive has broad lati-
tude in filling the gaps of statutory language. Moreover, as Congress' 
failed attempt to statutorily overrule the gag order suggests, it may well 
take a two-thirds supermajority for Congress to trump the regulatory ini-
tiatives of the executive. The Reagan-and later the Bush-administra-
tion made good use of this regulatory authority to advance its pro-life 
agenda. Policies on fetal tissue research, U.S. AID grant recipients, the 
importation of RU-486, and the permissibility of abortions in military hos-
pitals were all promulgated pursuant to the executive's authority to im-
plement the laws. 
The effective exercise of rule-making authority requires the Presi-
dent to appoint like-minded individuals to administer abortion-related 
programs. Abortion and American Politics, however, does not take into ac-
count how the Reagan White House made use of its appointments au-
thority. To start, Reagan's regulatory appointees, according to political 
scientists George Eads and Mike Fix, were "selected for their symbolic 
value rather than their administrative skills" and "there was no apprecia-
ble fear of the damage controversial appointees could generate."75 On 
abortion-related issues, not surprisingly, a number of Reagan appointees 
came from the Right-to-Life movement: OPM head Donald Devine had 
run the Life Amendment Political Action Committee; Centers for Disease 
Control director James Mason had opposed abortion rights as head of 
Utah's state health department; Health and Human Services secretary 
Richard Schweiker had, as a U.S. Senator, sponsored a constitutional 
amendment to overturn Roe; Title X family planning program head 
Maxjory Mecklenburg was a founder of the National Right to Life Com-
mittee and her eventual successor Jo Ann Gasper had been editor of the 
Right Woman; and Surgeon General C. Everett Koop had written and lec-
tured against abortion. 76 The Reagan administration also made opposi-
73. The Reagan administration had earlier (and unsuccessfully) proposed legislation 
to prohibit Title X recipients from discussing abortion as a family planning alternative (p. 
188). 
74. Rust, Ill S. Ct. at 1767. 
75. George C. Eads & Michael Fix, Relief or Reform: Reagan's Regulatory Dilemma 
143 (1984). 
76. See McKeegan, supra note 13, at 48 (Donald Devine, Director of Office of 
Personnel Management), 53 (Dr. James Mason, Director of Centers for Disease Control), 
66 (Richard Schweicker, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services), 67 
(Mrujory Mecklenburg, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Population Affairs), 114 Uo Ann 
Gasper, succeeded Mecklenburg), 121 (C. Everett Koop, Surgeon General). Although her 
biographical background on these Reagan appointees is accurate, it should be noted that 
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tion to abortion a litmus test for key government posts. Charles Fried's 
nomination for Solicitor General, for example, hinged on his willingness, 
as Acting Solicitor General, to ask the Supreme Court to overturn Roe.77 
This policy cohesiveness stands in sharp contrast to the Carter administra-
tion where top Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) appointees partic-
ipated in a meeting organized by White House advisor Midge Costanza to 
protest against Carter and his HEW Secretary Joseph Califano's opposi-
tion to federal funding of abortion.78 Reagan administration policy cohe-
siveness also helps explain the effectiveness of Reagan's regulatory 
campaign against abortion. 
Another significant presidential weapon not seriously considered by 
Craig and O'Brien is the veto power. The veto power, as the experiences 
of the Bush administration demonstrate, can be used in two ways. First, 
the President can block congressionally supported programs that he dis-
favors. Bush's veto of legislative efforts to reinstate fetal tissue research 
and suspend the gag rule fits this category.79 Second, the veto power can 
sometimes be used to force Congress to adopt a presidentially supported 
program. This is precisely what occurred when Congress refused to reen-
act a 1989 provision of the D.C. spending bill prohibiting the expendi-
ture of both federal and city funds to pay for abortions.80 Bush vetoed 
the bill and demanded that Congress reinsert the city funding prohibi-
tion. Recognizing the necessity of passing a spending bill and failing to 
override the Bush veto, Congress ultimately capitulated and reinserted 
the prohibition of both federal and city abortion expenditures. 
3. The States. - The states are as prominent as the federal govern-
ment in shaping the abortion dispute. Prior to Roe v. Wade, abortion bat-
tles were the near exclusive province of the states. Since Rne, as Craig and 
O'Brien argue, the states have been afforded and have taken advantage 
of "multiple opportunities for thwarting compliance with, or implementa-
tion of [Roe]" (p. 77). With recent decisions like Webster v. Reproductive 
Health Services81 and Planned Parenthood v. Casrry82 acknowledging broad 
state authority to regulate (although not prohibit) abortion, the scope of 
abortion rights seems to hinge on state politics. 
Abortion and American Politics explains the pivotal role played by state 
actors in this constitutional dynamic. State responses to Roe (pp. 78-100) 
as well as state politics after Webster (pp. 279-303) are considered sepa-
McKeegan's book is the work of an advocate hostile to Reagan's "New Right" anti-abortion 
agenda. 
77. See Stephen Wermeil, Reagan Names Fried to Become Solicitor General, Wall St. 
]., Sept. 26, 1985, at 64. 
78. See Califano, supra note 46, at 65. 
79. On the gag rule, see 137 Cong. Rec. H10,491, Nov. 19, 1991 (daily ed.). On fetal 
tissue, see Pub. Papers 1992-93 (1), at 1005. 
80. See Fisher & Devins, supra note 14, at 235-37. 
81. 492 u.s. 490 (1989). 
82. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
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rately and at length. State politics before Rne is also examined, but not in 
any detail (pp. 73-78). 
Rne v. Wade, although setting in motion the contemporary abortion 
dispute, did not appear in a political vacuum. Actions in the 1960s by the 
American Law Institute, American Medical Association, and various reli-
gious organizations spurred nineteen states to liberalize their criminal 
statutes governing abortion (p. 74). Of equal significance, only three 
states (Louisiana, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania) prohibited all abortions 
(p. 74). In the early 1970s, although thirty-four states had rejected re-
form initiatives,83 more dramatic change seemed possible. The National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted a Uniform 
Abortion Act, which would have placed no limitations on abortion during 
the first twenty weeks of pregnancy.s4 
The Court in Rne sought to ride the crest of these reform efforts. 
State responses to Rne, however, reveal that the nation was not prepared 
to accept the Court's decision. Indeed, in the year following Rne, 260 bills 
aimed at restricting abortion rights were introduced and thirty-nine were 
enacted (p. 77). Moreover, by turning abortion rights advocates' princi-
pal objective into a constitutional mandate, reform efforts became the 
province of groups seeking to chip away at, if not destroy, Rne. 
Anti-abortion interest groups had huge success. From 1973 to 1989, 
306 abortion measures were passed by forty-eight states. The principal 
weapons of Rne's opponents were attempts to make abortion less attrac-
tive through so-called "burden creation" strategies. These strategies in-
cluded increasing the risks of undergoing an abortion (statutes 
forbidding a safe abortion method-saline amniocentesis-while permit-
ting more dangerous abortion techniques); reducing accessibility to med-
ical facilities that perform abortions (statutes demanding that all 
abortions be performed in a hospital and zoning laws restricting the 
number of abortion clinics); jncreasing the cost of abortions (statutes re-
quiring pathologist or other physician involvement in abortion proce-
dures); and establishing detailed pre-abortion procedures (statutes 
requiring women to be informed of the "medical risks" of abortion and to 
wait at least twenty-four hours after consenting to the abortion 
procedure). 85 
Abortion and American Politics expertly details this first wave of state 
resistance to Rne. Through sections on health regulations, public fund-
ing, advertising, fetal protection, and parental consent and notification, 
Craig and O'Brien nicely summarize the various categories of post-Rne 
83. See Lynn D. Wardle & Mary Anne Q. Wood, A Lawyer Looks at Abortion 43 
(1982). 
84. See Fisher & Devins, supra note 14, at 234. 
85. See Albert M. Pearson & Paul M. Kurtz, The Abortion Controversy: A Study in 
Law and Politics, 8 Harv.J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 427, 433-34 (1985). For an alternative typology, 
see Rubin, supra note 8, at 127-30 (describing seven types of abortion·related legislation 
enacted immediately after &e). · 
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regulation and the states that supported those regulations (pp. 78-94). 
This accounting reveals the obvious, namely, that "[t]he price of preserv-
ing diversity in the states ... comes at the cost of nationally uniform laws" 
(p. 94).86 
Just as Rne transformed state abortion politics in 1973, the Court's 
1989 Webster decision signaled a new era in abortion politics. On the 
brink of overturning Rne, the Court declared "the rigid Rne framework" 
unworkable and opened the door to anti-abortion legislation by approv-
ing, among other things, second trimester fetal viability tests.s7 In the 
days following Webster, pro-choice and pro-life interest groups predicted 
an avalanche of anti-abortion legislation. sa 
Webster did not live up to its interest group billing. From 1989 to 
1992, only fourteen statutes were enacted; nine pro-choice and five pro-
life (p. 282). This paucity of enacted bills prompted the Alan Gutmacher 
Institute to conclude that "[t]he wholesale changes in abortion law that 
had been widely predicted by activists, political pundits and the media 
[are yet to occur. Instead,] ... law makers [have] stayed in the 'safe,' 
familiar, middle ground."89 Craig and O'Brien reach a similar conclu-
sion and glean from the mixed results and modest volume of legislative 
output that there are now "uvo powerful, determined, and politically ac-
tive forces-one on each side of the abortion issue-and caught in the 
middle [are] the state politicians" (p. 299). 
This conclusion is hardly groundbreaking, but it goes a long way to-
ward explaining the events of the past few years. It explains, for example, 
that legislative inertia can be a measure of a decision's impact. It also 
suggests that pro-choice interests are politically dominant in states that 
protect abortion rights and, correspondingly, that pro-life interests are 
dominant in states that enact anti-abortion measures. Otherwise, pro-
choice interests would have enough clout to kill off pro-life initiatives and 
vice versa. Craig and O'Brien recoguize the role of interest group pres-
sure but also point to other factors that explain legislative decision-mak-
ing such as the nature of competing issues, the demographics of the 
population, and the perspectives of key legislators as well as the governor 
(p. 283). 
86. Craig and O'Brien never discuss whether uniformity in abortion legislation is a 
value worth pursuing and consequently provide no guidance on whether the "cost" of 
sacrificing uniformity is a matter of consequence. 
87. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 518-19 (1989). 
88. Representative Chris Smith, Chair of the Congressional Pro-Life Caucus, beamed 
that Webster would "lead to the enactment of state laws" and the "saving of many children." 
Planned Parenthood Press Conference, Fed. News Serv., July 3, 1989, available in LEXIS, 
Nexis Library, Omni File. Kate Michelman, Executive Director of National Abortion 
Rights Action League, warned that "[w]omen's lives hang by a thread, and the Justices this 
morning handed the state politicians a pair of scissors." Id. 
89. The Alan Gutmacher Inst., State Reproductive Health Monitor: Legislative 
Proposals and Actions, December 1990 at i. 
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A factor not considered by Craig and O'Brien in their assessment of 
state abortion politics is the often pivotal role played by state court 
judges. Before Rne, several state courts struck dovm anti-abortion laws. 90 
Mter the Supreme Court concluded in Harris v. McRaen that a congres-
sional prohibition on the use of Medicaid funds for abortions did not 
Violate the Equal Protection Clause, courts in California, Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, and Oregon interpreted their ovm 
constitutions to protect the right of indigent women to a state-funded 
abortion. The New Jersey Supreme Court pointed out that "state Consti-
tutions are separate sources of individual freedoms and restrictions on 
the exercise of power by the Legislature. . . . Although the state Constitu-
tion may encompass a smaller universe than the federal Constitution, our 
constellation of rights may be more complete. "92 
Ten states' constitutions contain explicit privacy provisions and sev-
eral others contain clauses that have been interpreted to protect the right 
to privacy. Some state courts have applied these provisions to protect 
abortion rights. For example, the California Supreme Court ruled that 
"the federal right of privacy ... is more limited than the corresponding 
right in the California Constitution" and that restrictions on abortion 
funding for indigent women therefore violated California's explicit pri-
vacy right.93 
Victories in state court, moreover, do not end the political struggle. 
Instead, the state legislature and voters engage state courts in a dialogue 
over the meaning of the state constitution. Take the case of California. 
In 1981, the California Supreme Court declared that the legislature could 
not restrict state funding for abortions for indigent women, but in each 
of the last ten years the legislature passed laws restricting the funding. 
Each year the courts struck down the laws and reinstated the funding. 94 
Conservatives attempted to make use of the ballot box to remove liberal 
judges. California Chief Justice Rose Elizabeth Bird and two other jus-
tices were ousted in 1986 when conservatives targeted them for electoral 
defeat. A five-two conservative m~ority now dominates the court, but it 
90. See Survey of Abortion Law, 1980 Ariz. St. LJ. 67, 106-11. See also Rubin, supra 
note 8, at 31-57 (chronicling Court opinions leading up to Roe). 
91. 448 u.s. 297, 299 (1980). 
92. Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 931 (NJ. 1982) (citations omitted). 
93. Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 796 (Cal. 
1981). Following Webster, pro-choice groups scored impressive court victories in California 
and Florida. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van de Kamp, 263 Cal. Rptr. 46, 55 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (Affirming grant of an injunction preventing implementation of a hili 
that would prevent unemancipated minors from having abortions without parental 
consent); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1194 (Fla. 1989) (holding that a statute that requires 
parental consent of judicial bypass for minors seeking an abortion unconstitutionally 
intrudes on the privacy rights of pregnant minors). 
94. See, e.g., Philip Hager, Court Again Rejects Curbs on Abortions, L.A. Times, Nov. 
17, 1989, at A3. 
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continues to issue an expansive interpretation of California's privacy 
right.95 
Webster and Casey, by substituting an "undue burden" test for Roe's 
trimester standard, have made state politics the fulcrum of the abortion 
dispute. Prior to Webster, Roe and its progeny left little room for signifi-
cant state regulation. That state legislators were activists during this Roe 
to Webster period yet are extraordinarily cautious today says a good deal 
about state attitudes both toward abortions and toward the Supreme 
Court. Abortion and American Politics does not address this issue; instead, it 
simply concludes that "[h]ow the battles in the states shape up, and 
whether and what kinds of new restrictions on abortion emerge depend 
on the politics of each state" (p. 349). 
B. On Constitutional Diawgues and the Abortion Dispute 
The abortion dispute reveals that the shaping of constitutional values 
is a dynamic process in which the courts, the executive, and the legisla-
ture engage in a dialogue with each other at both the federal and state 
level. The Supreme Court has moderated Roe's stringent trimester stan-
dard thanks to presidentially nominated and Senate confirmed judicial 
appointments, amicus filings by the Solicitor General and congressional 
groups, and state legislators whose willingness to legislatively challenge 
Roe created repeated opportunities for the Court to fine-tune its abortion 
doctrine. With Webster and Casey, the Court recognized that state legisla-
tures and courts will likely play the pivotal role in defining the reaches 
and limits of abortion rights. 
Congress and the White House have also shaped abortion rights and 
participated in a dialogue with the courts and each other through legisla-
tive enactments and administrative rule-making. Congress puts into law a 
vision of constitutional meaning whenever it enacts abortion-related legis-
lation; the executive likewise participates in these matters through the 
President's signing of this legislation and the Justice Department's de-
fense of these measures; the courts, finally, adjudicate constitutional chal-
lenges to these enactments. Administrative rule-making follows a similar 
interactive course-agency heads engage in constitutional interpretation 
when promulgating regulations. The executive, moreover, defends these 
regulations in court and fends off congressional attacks through testi-
mony, and if need be, the veto power. Congress also participates in rule-
making through its confirmation of agency heads, oversight of govern-
ment programs, amici filings in court, and occasionally through legisla-
tion to moderate disfavored initiatives. Finally, the courts have entered 
the fray through decisions concerning the scope of executive power to 
interpret vague statutory language. 
95. See Van de Kamp, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 46. 
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This dynamic is pervasive. 96 It clearly shows the judiciary to be one 
part of a constitutional dialogue that involves all of government. Abortion 
and American Politics, despite hinging its argument on constitutional deci-
sion-making being much more than pronouncements of the Supreme 
Court, does not speak of this dialogue. Craig and O'Brien certainly de-
scribe the numerous initiatives of Congress, the President, and the states. 
What they do not do is explain how the actions of one branch interface 
with the actions of another. Abortion and American Politics sees each event 
as a snapshot; that these interacting events form a mosaic is not revealed 
by Craig and O'Brien. Consequently, the story they tell is interesting but 
less interesting than it could be, and their depiction of constitutional de-
cision-making is accurate but less accurate than it could be. 
Abortion and American Politics would also benefit if it approached non-
judicial influences in a more systematic fashion. Congress, the executive, 
and the states all make use of different types of powers at different mo-
ments (before judicial action, during a<ljudication, and after judicial ac-
tion). In understanding elected branch influences, it is important to 
know what these powers are and when they are used. Craig and O'Brien, 
although describing the most significant episodes of elected branch in-
volvement, never connect these critical episodes to a fuller description of 
what techniques are used by elected government and when they will be 
used. In addition, by focusing their efforts on critical episodes, there are 
some gaps in their coverage of the techniques of elected branch influ-
ences. Congressional oversight of agency enforcement, the veto power, 
and the appointment and confirmation of agency officials are important 
topics that go virtually unnoticed in Abortion and American Politics. 
Craig and O'Brien understate how nuanced and how complex 
elected branch action is by failing to delineate systematically nonjudicial 
influences. Take the case of the Reagan-Bush federal family planning 
rules. By discussing the promulgation (pp. 188-90), judicial approval 
(pp. 331-32), and repeal of these rules (p. 358) as three discrete events, 
Craig and O'Brien provide few insights into the ways in which all three 
branches may play off one another. For example, Congress' 1991 efforts 
to statutorily override family planning regulations were intended to ex-
press dissatisfaction with the executive for promulgating the order and 
the courts for upholding it. 
These criticisms of Abortion and American Politics should not be over-
stated. Craig and O'Brien's account is cogent and detailed. Indeed, with 
a little diligence, the reader can piece together what powers the various 
branches possess and when they are likely to exercise those powers. 
Nonetheless, by placing the onus of interpretive responsibility squarely 
with the reader, Craig and O'Brien dilute their central claim about the 
pervasiveness of elected government action. 
96. See sources cited supra notes 8, 16, 19 and 22. 
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II. ABORTION AND ELECTED BRANCH INTERPRETATION CONSIDERED: 
EXTENDING ABORTION AND AME.RrCAN POLITICS 
The abortion dispute reveals a great deal about the American gov-
ernmental and political processes. "[T] hat [Supreme Court] decisions on 
highly controversial matters are rarely final" (pp. xiv-xv) is the lesson that 
Craig and O'Brien glean from their examin!ltion of state and federal 
abortion politics. A modest extension of Craig and O'Brien's assessment, 
as Part I demonstrates, reveals that constitutional values are shaped by a 
highly interactive dynamic that involves repeated volleys between the ex-
ecutive, legislative, and judicial branches of both state and federal govern-
ment. Craig and O'Brien, however, leave unexamined numerous issues 
critical to an understanding of elected branch constitutional interpreta-
tion as well as abortion's impact on the governmental process. This sec-
tion will extend Abortion and American Politics by examining four of these 
issues: the reasons why elected government regularly makes use of some 
but not all of its powers to shape constitutional disputes; the seriousness 
with which elected government approaches constitutional issues; the im-
pact of single issue politics on political institutions; and elected govern-
ment attitudes towards the judiciary. Although these issues never surface 
in Abortion and American Politics, they all lurk in the background of the 
events recounted by Craig and O'Brien. Consequently, while this section 
will extend Abortion and American Politics, it will principally rely on epi-
sodes discussed in the book. 
A Elected Government's Choice of Response 
Patterns of congressional and White House responses to Roe have 
emerged over the past twenty years. Congressional opposition to Roe has 
been principally expressed in funding prohibitions, many of which must 
be reenacted every year. Constitutional amendments, court-stripping, 
and statutory repeal have been rejected. When Congress acts to support 
abortion rights, moreover, it typically acts to rein in either the executive 
for a regulation which it disapproves or the courts for a statutory interpre-
tation it disfavors. Constitutional amendments or statutory language as-
serting the correctness of Roe have been eschewed. Since Ronald 
Reagan's 1980 election, the presidency has made use of all the weapons 
available to it to advance its pro-choice or pro-life positions. Judicial and 
administrative appointments, legislative initiatives, the veto power, rule-
making, and the bully pulpit head the list of these presidential tools. 
Congress' mixed approach and its heavy reliance on appropriations-
based policymaking are quite understandable. Appropriations measures 
are preferred over constitutional amendment and direct statutory repeals 
because they are easier to enact.97 Take the case of the Hyde Amend-
ment. Anti-abortion forces, unable to get statutory and constitutional 
97. See Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation 
Riders, 1987 Duke LJ. 456, 456-59. 
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amendment proposals out of committee, turned their attention to the 
subterranean world of appropriations-based policymaking. Appropria-
tions measures must be enacted every year, and anti-abortion forces, 
through a simple floor amendment, were able to compel a majority up or 
down vote on Medicaid funding. That Congress would approve such a 
funding ban is hardly surprising. A funding ban leaves the right intact 
and hence appears to be a moderate response. Congress' decision not to 
finance an activity which many find morally reprehensible does not neces-
sarily call into question the correctness of Roe; instead, the decision not to 
appropriate is part and parcel of Congress' power of the purse. It is also a 
decision-because of the single year nature of appropriations-with a 
limited shelf life and great opportunity for fine tuning. Direct legislative 
repeals, in contrast, are uncompromising and consequently, the political 
costs of supporting such measures are great 
Congress' pro-abortion decision-making follows a similar pattern. 
Direct affirmations of Roe, such as the proposed Freedom of Choice Act 
of 1989,98 have been rejected. Congress instead limits its pro-choice activ-
ity to decision-making that does not explicitly reaffirm Roe. Legislation to 
restore fetal tissue research and to allow family planning centers to dis-
cuss abortion were designed to check an overly aggressive executive. This 
is a classic exercise of Congress' oversight authority. Along the same 
lines, were Congress to enact abortion clinic access legislation in response 
to the Supreme Court's Bray decision,99 Congress would simply be check-
ing what it perceived as the Court's misinterpretation of statutory lan-
guage.100 In both instances, Congress would be playing a reactive role 
where decisional costs were kept to a minimum. 
On issues as divisive as abortion, Congress has strong incentives not 
to prompt the ire of losers by making decisions that are too final. In 
addition to the desire of many members of Congress to avoid decisional 
costs, the failure of absolutist approaches is also attributable to Congress' 
structure. Because Congress only acts collectively, pro-choice and pro-life 
members of Congress who adopt extreme views and want to exercise Con-
gress' power in a forceful manner often cancel each other out 
Congress' reluctance to embrace a substantive theory of abortion 
rights is also evidenced in legislative filings before the courts. In cases 
calling into question the correctness and scope of abortion rights, coali-
98. S. 1912, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (prohibiting states from restricting the right 
of a woman to choose abortion prior to fetal viability except when necessary to protect the 
woman's life). 
99. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993) (holding that Ku 
Klux Klan Act does not apply to Operation Rescue Protestors blockading abortion clinics). 
100. Congress likewise responded to the Court's perceived misinterpretation of 
employment discrimination statutes when it enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 
Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1980) (amending§ 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
Specifically, Congress disapproved of Supreme Court decisions upholding state and private 
exclusion of pregnancy-related costs from health care coverage. See General Elec. Co. v. 
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
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tions of pro-choice and pro-life congressional amici file competing briefs 
before the Court.101 Bipartisan congressional support is more likely-
although far from a sure thing-in cases that implicate legislative powers. 
For example, when the Supreme Court adjudicated the constitutionality 
of the Hyde Amendment, 102 a bipartisan coalition of pro-choice and pro-
life legislators advanced a broad interpretation of Congress' appropria-
tions power.103 
White House decision-making, on the other hand, has been cali-
brated differently from that of Congress. Rather than only playing a reac-
tive role, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton have been activists. Reagan's anti-
abortion speeches and regulatory agenda, Bush's defense of that agenda 
in court and through the veto, and Clinton's immediate dismantling of 
Reagan-Bush programs exemplify the White House's commitment to vig-
orous and strident leadership on the abortion question.104 This activ-
ism-like Congress' decision to minimize decisional costs-is pragmatic. 
Unwilling to alienate both pro-choice and pro-life interests with a Carter-
esque middle ground strategy, the White House aligns itself with one or 
the other set of interest groups in the abortion dispute. 
Starting with the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan, for example, every 
President has subscribed to a substantive theory of abortion rights and 
has been willing to back up that theory with Supreme Court filings and 
arguments. While the theories of pro-choice and pro-life administrations 
are incompatible with each other, the singular nature of the presidency 
apparently demands that the executive embrace one or the other theory. 
On questions of presidential authority, moreover, pro-choice and pro-life 
administrations have advanced similar arguments. The Reagan, Bush, 
and Clinton administrations, among other things, have endorsed broad 
executive branch authority to interpret vague legislative mandates.105 
Congress' tendency to be reactive and diffuse as well as the compet-
ing executive tendency to endorse one or the other side are critically im-
portant factors in understanding the abortion dispute. By the same 
token, an examination of the abortion dispute helps explain other factors 
101. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. 
102. Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976). 
103. See Brief of jim Wright, supra note 42. 
104. The President has broad authority to advance his policy initiatives as part of his 
constitutional responsibility to execute the law. See Jeremy A. Rabkin & Neal E. Devins, 
Averting Government by Consent Decree: Constitutional Limits on the Enforcement of 
Settlements with the Federal Government, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 203, 219-28 (1987). For 
example, it is inappropriate for any administration to make use of judicially approved 
consent decrees to bind its successors to its policy preferences. See id. at 227-28. With 
respect to abortion-related regulations, the Clinton administration was in no way legally or 
morally bound by Reagan-Bush initiatives just as the Reagan administration was not bound 
by Carter-era interpretations. 
105. See supra notes 54-59, 69-73, 78 and accompanying text (discussing how Reagan 
promulgated, Bush defended, and Clinton repealed regulations governing the mentioning 
of abortion by federally funded family planning centers). 
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that motivate both the White House and Congress. Specifically, by utiliz-
ing all of his powers, the President has maximized his influence in shap-
ing the tone of the abortion debate vis-a-vis Congress. On regulatory 
matters, for example, the executive has hardly been confined by the 
broader boundaries of the legislation which Congress enacted. Initiatives 
on fetal tissue research, family planning counseling, and the like suggest 
that executive branch authority is catapulted by broadly stated legislative 
mandates. Craig and O'Brien, who use the abortion dispute to ''vividly 
illustrate how our political institutions actually operate" (p. xiii) would 
have been well served by considering the institutional tugs and pulls that 
help explain elected government decision-making. 
B. The Seriousness Wzth Which Elected Branches Undertake Interpretation 
Does elected government take seriously its responsibility as constitu-
tional interpreter?106 After all, lawmakers and regulators might simply 
pursue whatever policies serve their interests and leave questions of con-
stitutionality to the courts. Alternatively, lawmakers and regulators could 
invest great time and energy in determining what is and is not constitu-
tional. The abortion dispute suggests, not surprisingly, that the truth lies 
somewhere in between. Sorting out why some but not all matters are 
given serious attention is useful in understanding both the abortion dis-
pute and the American system of government. This inquiry applies with 
equal force to Congress, the executive, and the states. For the purposes 
of illustration, only Congress will be considered. 
Congressional decision-making is highly visible, greatly observed, 
and much criticized. Committee hearings and reports, floor debates, and 
amici curiae filings call attention to the seriousness with which Congress 
approaches the task of constitutional interpretation.107 Congress has 
made varied use of these tools in its consideration of abortion-related 
issues. Little to no attention was paid to constitutional concerns in the 
Hyde Amendment debates or the enactment of the Adolescent Family 
106. On the issue of whether elected government should interpret the Constitution, 
see sources cited supra notes 7, 16. See also Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous 
Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 1-33 (2d ed. 1986) (addressing the 
history of and justifications for judicial review); Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 
and the Idea of Progress (1971); Symposium, Perspectives on the Authoritativeness of 
Supreme Court Decisions, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 977-1095 (1987); Herbert Wechsler, The Courts 
and the Constitution, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1001 (1965) (analyzing the political and moral 
limits ofjudicial review). 
107. See, e.g., Paul Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and its Power to 
Counter Judicial Doctrine, 21 Ga. L. Rev. 57 (1986) (Congress has neither the institutional 
nor political capacity to engage in effective constitutional deliberation); Abner J. Mikva, 
How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. Rev. 587 
(1983) (same); Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 
N.C. L. Rev. 707 (1985) (Congress always has resources and sometimes has the inclination 
to interpret the Constitution effectively). 
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Life Act (AFLA) .108 In contrast, constitutional concerns seemed to play a 
role in Congress' consideration and ultimate rejection of constitutional 
amendment proposals, court-stripping proposals, the Human Life Act, 109 
and the Freedom of Choice Act.110 
The AFLA and Hyde Amendment support Owen Fiss's observation 
that legislators are disinterested in the "search for the meaning of consti-
tutional values, but instead see their primary function in terms of register-
ing the actual, occurrent preferences of the people."111 The AFLA and 
the Hyde Amendment each raised serious constitutional concerns-the 
AFLA because it prohibits religious organizations that engage in abortion 
counseling from participating in the AFLA program and the Hyde 
Amendment because its restrictions on Medicaid funding limit the availa-
bility of abortions. In each instance, constitutional challenges were sus-
tained by lower federal courts only to be overturned by bare five member 
m~orities in the Supreme Court.112 Congress, however, appeared indif-
ferent to constitutional concerns when enacting these measures. 
The AFLA originated in the Senate Labor and Human Resources 
Committee. Hearings held in March 1981 featured the testimony of 
economists, doctors, child psychologists, and sociologists-not constitu-
tional scholars.113 Likewise, the Committee Report makes no mention of 
constitutional issues.114 Indeed, when the AFLA was reauthorized in 
1984, Congress seemed relatively unconcerned that a constitutional chal-
lenge had been launched against the measure. Subcommittee Chair 
Jeremiah Denton simply noted that "[t]he courts will have to decide 
whether the law as passed by Congress is constitutional. The task before 
the subcommittee and the Congress is to oversee the activities of the cur-
rent act."115 
108. 42 U.S.C. § 300z-s (1982). 
109. See The "Human Life Bill": Hearings on S. 158 Before the Subcomm. on 
Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee on the judiciary, 97th Gong., 1st Sess. 1-7, 
64-66, 155-64 (1981) (statements by Senators) [hereinafter Hearings on The Human Life 
Bill]. 
110. See Freedom of Choice Act of 1989: Hearings on S.1912 Before the Senate 
Comm. on Labor & Human Resources, 101st Gong., 2d Sess 1-4 (1990) (statements by 
Senators regarding impact of proposed Act on Roe). 
111. Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms ofjustice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1979). 
112. See McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd sub nom. Harris v. 
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding Hyde Amendment); Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. 
Supp. 1547 (D.D.C. 1987), rev'd, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (upholding AFLA). 
113. See Oversight of Family Planning Programs, 1981: Hearings on Examination of 
the Role of the Federal Gov't in Birth Control, Abortion Referral, and Sex Education 
Programs Before the Senate Comm. on Labor & Human Resources, 97th Gong., 1st Sess., 
(1981). 
114. See Senate Comm. on Labor & Human Resources, Adolescent Family Life, S. 
Rep. No. 161, 97th Gong., 1st Sess. (1981). 
115. Reauthorization of the Adolescent Family Life Demonstration Projects Act of 
1981: Hearings on an Overview of the Adolescent Pregnancy Problem and 
Reauthorization of Title XX of the Public Health Services Act Before the Subcomm. on 
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Congress did not hold hearings or prepare a report when it enacted 
the Hyde Amendment. Introduced on the House floor, the Amendment 
vvas subject to prolonged, fierce, and emotional debate. While amend-
ment supporters occasionally criticized Rne as "mistaken and immoral" 
and Hyde opponents suggested that Congress' refusal "to pay for some-
thing guaranteed by the Constitution" is itself unconstitutional, these ref-
erences were rare and never rose above the level of conclusory 
rhetoric.116 Congress gave more careful attention to constitutional con-
cerns when the Hyde Amendment went before the Supreme Court. A 
bipartisan coalition of over 200 members of Congress, including mem-
bers who voted against Hyde, flied an amicus brief defending Congress' 
right not to spend money under the appropriations power.117 
Constitutional concerns did, however, pervade the attacks on Rne 
that occurred in the early 1980s. Pro-life forces were empowered through 
Republican control of both the White House and the Senate after the 
1980 election. In 1981, the Senate Judiciary Committee actively consid-
ered human life legislation, court-stripping proposals, and constitutional 
amendment proposals. In each case, extensive hearings were dominated 
by constitutional law experts. Committee and Subcommittee reports too 
were replete with citations to this expert testimony, as well as to Supreme 
Court decisions and law review articles.118 Unlike the Labor and Human 
Resources Committee's handling of the AFLA, the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee seemed keenly interested in separation of powers and constitu-
tional interpretation concerns. 
Differences between the Judiciary Committee and the Labor and 
Human Resources Committee are to be expected. Unlike the AFLA, 
where Congress used funding as a mechanism for abortion regulation, 
the early 1980s proposals directly challenged both the correctness of Rne 
and the propriety of judicial involvement in the abortion dispute. Consti-
tutional concerns could not be easily brushed aside in this context. 
Moreover, the Judiciary Committee's variable treatment of court-
stripping, human life, and constitutional amendment proposals supports 
its reputation as a "'Committee of Lawyers' [which] reacts to constitu-
tional questions in a very judicial, courtlike fashion."119 Court-stripping 
proposals, which were savaged as an inappropriate and unconstitutional 
interference with a co-equal branch by most constitutional experts as well 
Family and Human Services of the Senate Comm. on Labor & Human Resources, 98th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1984). 
116. See 122 Cong. Rec. 20,410-12; 30,898; 27,672-75 (1976). 
117. See Brief of Rep. Jim Wrigbt, supra note 42. 
118. Hearings on the Human Life Bill, supra note 108; Report of the Comm. on the 
Judiciary on SJ. Res. 110, Human Life Federalism Amendment, S. Rep. 465, 97th Cong., 
2d Sess., (1982) (with minority views) [hereinafter Report on Human Life Federalism 
Amendment]. 
119. Mark C. Miller, Congress and the Constitution: A Tale of Two Committees 39 
(1992) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
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as Attorney General William French Smith, 120 never emerged from com-
mittee. Proposed human life legislation also raised questions about Con-
gress' constitutional authority to respond to court decisions. 
Subcommittee Chair John East (Republican, North Carolina) described 
the proposal as an "'exercise [of] the authority of Congress ... based on 
an investigation of facts and on a decision concerning values that the 
Supreme Court has declined to address.' "121 Subcommittee hearings, 
however, revealed that most, but not all, legal academics opposed the bill 
on constitutional grounds.122 East persisted and a sharply divided sub-
committee reported the bill out, but issued a report presenting three dra-
matically different assessments of Congress' § 5 authority to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment.123 East thought Congress was constitutionally 
empowered to find that life begins at conception and to enforce that 
finding through legislation. Orrin Hatch (Republican, Utah), although 
strongly opposed to Roe, concluded that Congress' § 5 authority does not 
include the establishment of substantive rights whether they be voting 
rights or a fetus's right to life. Max Baucus (Democrat, Montana) argued 
that Congress can establish rights but cannot statutorily overturn 
Supreme Court decisions. East, Hatch, and Baucus all made the assess-
ment of Congress' authority the centerpiece of their remarks, with ample 
references to case law and the testimony of constitutional experts. 
The Human Life Bill never made it to the floor of Congress. Instead, 
the full Judiciary Committee focused its efforts on a proposed constitu-
tional amendment to return the abortion issue to the states. This alterna-
tive was favored for three reasons. First, it is beyond dispute that 
Congress may initiate a constitutional amendment to overturn a Supreme 
Court decision. Second, unlike statutory court-stripping and human life 
proposals which would nullify Court holdings without following constitu-
tionally specified procedures, constitutional amendment proposals ex-
press disapproval of Roe without challenging judicial authority. Third, 
"[w]ithout actually moving to outlaw abortion," the Federalism Amend-
ment enabled Congress to "demonstrate [its] concern about [Roe], while at 
the same time disposing of this troublesome issue by throwing it back to 
the states."124 
120. See Keynes with Miller, supra note 19, at 292-98. 
121. See Burgess, supra note 19, at 36-48. 
122. See Hearings on the Human Life Bill, supra note 108 (including, e.g., testimony 
of Robert Bork, 308-17; testimony and prepared statement of Laurence H. Tribe, 242-55). 
123. See Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
The Human Life Bill S.158: Report Together with Additional and Minority Views to the 
Committee on the Judiciary, S. Rep. No. 1, 97th Gong., 1st Sess. 20-29, 33-38, 39-43 
(1981). 
124. Jaffee, et al., supra note 19, at 115. Congress' desire to pass the &e buck back to 
the states also explains why the Senate Judiciary Committee did not act on a constitutional 
amendment to define a fetus as a person (pp. 137-46); see also Mark A. Graber, The Non-
Majoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 35, 
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Constitutional concerns were given serious treatment at both the 
subcommittee and committee level. Subcommittee hearings included 
several constitutional experts who discussed both the soundness of Roe 
and the appropriateness of checking the court through a constitutional 
amendment.125 The judiciary Committee, which voted 10-7 to report the 
amendment out, likewise addressed these constitutional interpretation 
and structure of government concerns in its report.126 Floor debates on 
the amendment, although varied, also considered the correctness of Roe 
as a matter of constitutional interpretation.127 
Early 1980s anti-abortion initiatives demonstrate Congress' recogni-
tion that constitutional interpretation plays a critical role in the abortion 
dispute. Critics of Congress are unimpressed by this constitutional exege-
sis. Paul Brest, for example, argues that the legislative history of the 
Human Life Bill reveals that constitutional complications are typically 
raised by bill opponents as "rhetorical stratagems" and that proponents 
sought to stack the hearing with pro-life witnesses and eventually drafted 
a "Subcommittee report [which] reads more like an advocate's brief than 
a judicial opinion."128 The fact remains, however, that many abortion 
opponents disapproved of human life and court-stripping legislation as a 
constitutionally inappropriate substitution of legislative for judicial au-
thority.129 Along the same lines, abortion rights supporters defended the 
Hyde Amendment as a constitutionally permissible exercise of the appro-
priations power. 
Whatever one's views of the skillfulness and seriousness with which 
Congress approaches constitutional interpretation, abortion politics is 
certainly affected by the ways in which Congress balances constitutional 
and other concerns. Abortion and American Politics does not consider this 
subject, however. Craig and O'Brien offer no guidance on different com-
mittees' approaches to constitutional analysis, the relevance of staff-domi-
nated hearings and committee reports to Congress' workproduct, the 
role of Supreme Court precedents in Congress' deliberations, and other 
such matters. These questions, however, are quite relevant to under-
standing both the abortion dispute and the political institutions involved 
in the dispute. The same can be said of the seriousness with which the 
executive branch and the states approach constitutional interpretation-
another topic unexplored by Craig and O'Brien. 
53-61 (1993) (Congress typically seeks to avoid speaking to the correctness or 
incorrectness of Roe). 
125. See Hearings on S. 158, supra note 121, at 242, 275, 328 (testimony of Laurence 
H. Tribe, William Van Alstyne, and Archibald Cox). 
126. See Report on Human Life Federlism Amendment, supra note 117 at 1, 7, 53-54. 
127. See 129 Cong. Rec. 17,570-78 (1983). 
128. Brest, supra note 106, at 93, 97; see also Burgess, supra note 19, at 48 (Congress' 
performance as constitutional interpreter during Human Life hearings "suggest a mixed 
result"). 
129. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
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C. Institutional Concerns 
The abortion dispute has exacted a heavy price on all three branches 
of the federal government. Specifically, abortion's dominance as a single 
issue concern has subordinated competing and otherwise relevant con-
cerns in congressional and executive decision-making. Abortion's domi-
nance has also altered public perceptions of the Supreme Court, if not 
the Court's perception of itself. 
The nomination and confirmation of federal courtjudges, especially 
Supreme Court Justices, is the most obvious example of how the abortion 
issue displaces other concerns. Beginning with Ronald Reagan, presi-
dents have been under great pressure to use support or opposition to 
abortion as a "litmus test" in the judicial selection process. Reagan made 
"judicial restraint" and opposition to the "creat[ion] [of] new constitu-
tional 'rights' out of thin air" the trademark of his judicial appoint-
ments.130 A desire to please pro-life interests figures prominently in this 
calculation. Some judicial nominees "'were asked directly about their 
views on abortion'" (p. 175, quoting Nina Totenberg); one appeals court 
nomination was ·withdrawn after it became known that the nominee con-
tributed to Planned Parenthood (pp. 174-75); and pro-life interests scut-
tled the planned nomination of federal appeals court Judge Patrick 
Higginbotham to the Supreme Court because he recognized-albeit re-
luctantly-Roe to be the law of the land in one of his opinions.131 The 
Clinton administration appears no different. Candidate Bill Clinton 
stated "that a judge ought to be able to answer a question in a Senate 
hearing, 'Do you or do you not support the right to privacy, including the 
right to choose?' "132 With respect to his Supreme Court nominee Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, Clinton commented that her writings suggest she is pro-
choice "and that was to me the important thing."133 
The abortion issue has, on occasion, dominated other areas of exec-
utive-judicial relations. Abortion, for example, figured largely in the staff-
ing of the Justice Department's Office for Legal Policy (charged with 
judicial selection) and the Solicitor General's Office. Rex Lee resigned as 
Solicitor General after Reagan's first term, in part because of his unwill-
ingness to respond to administration-condoned interest group pressure 
and to ask the Supreme Court to overturn Roe and other disfavored rul-
ings. Speaking of the importance of stare decisis, Lee spoke of resenting 
"this notion that my job is to press the Administration's policies at every 
turn and announce true conservative principles through the pages of my 
briefs. It is not."I34 Open opposition to abortion, however, had become 
130. Markman, supra note 65 at 33. 
131. See Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994, 995-96 (5th Cir. 1986). 
132. Inside Politics (CNN television broadcast, June 30, 1992) (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
133. Stephen Labaton, Senators See Easy Approval for Nominee, N.Y. Times, June 16, 
1993, at A22. 
134. Lincoln Caplan, The Tenth Justice 107 (1987) (quoting Rex Lee). 
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a prerequisite of a Reagan administration Solicitor General-Charles 
Fried's nomination may well have been contingent on his seeking Rne's 
reversal as Acting Solicitor General. ISS 
Abortion has likewise affected legislativejudicial relations, becoming 
the pivotal issue in Senate Judiciary Committee confirmation hearings. 
Starting with the 1981 nomination of Sandra Day O'Connor, Committee 
questioning and Committee reports, while paying some attention to 
other issues, bespeak a near obsession with right-to-privacy concerns. 
David Souter, for example, spoke at his confirmation hearings of Rne v. 
Wade as "the one case which has been on everyone's mind and on every-
one's lips since the moment of my nomination. "136 Clarence Thomas, in 
contrast, caused an uproar by claiming never to have discussed or even 
thought about the correctness of Rne v. Wade. Since the Bork nomina-
tion, moreover, the Judiciary Committee has made clear to nominees that 
a willingness to profess belief in the right to privacy and a respect for 
stare decisis is a prerequisite for the job,l37 Indeed, in explaining why 
Bork was unacceptable, the Senate Judiciary Committee Report empha-
sized his "narrow definition of liberty" being at odds with the "image of 
human dignity [which] has been associated throughout our history with 
the idea that the Constitution recognizes 'unenumerated rights.'"tss 
Abortion has also proven surprisingly critical to Congress' annual en-
actment of the federal budget. Technically, House and Senate rules pre-
clude substantive policymaking through appropriations.139 This 
distinction between authorizations and appropriations is designed to en-
sure both that fiscal policy concerns dominate debates over the budget 
and that committees with subject matter expertise screen authorizing leg-
islation. The Hyde Amendment reveals the limits of the appropriations-
authorizations distinction and, with it, the impossibility of confining ap-
propriations to fiscal policy matters. First enacted in 1976, the Hyde 
Amendment has proven a permanent and destabilizing force in appropri-
ations policymaking. Debate over abortion provisions in the fiscal year 
1977 rider lasted eleven weeks, with dozens of compromise proposals on 
the floor. The fiscal year 1978 stalemate was worse, lasting more than five 
135. See Wermeil, supra note 40. 
136. Nomination of David H. Souter to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 
101st Gong., 2d Sess. 54 (1990). 
137. See Wermeil, supra note 40, at 124. Pro-choice interests' focus on privacy-
rather than abortion per se--is understandable. The Block Bork Coalition emphasized 
Bork's attack against privacy in order to "pluck the heartstrings of [the] middle class" and 
thereby avoid White House charges that the Bork opposition was merely a thinly veiled 
pro-choice special interest group. See Fisher & Devins, supra note 14, at 200 (quoting 
abortion rights activist Ann Lewis) (alteration in original). 
138. S. Exec. Rep. No. 7, lOOth Gong., 1st Sess. 8, 8 (1987). 
139. See Devins, supra note 96, at 458 & n.12; Louis Fisher, The Authorization 
Appropriation Process in Congress: Formal Rules and Informal Practices, 29 Catholic 
Univ. L. Rev. 51 (1979). 
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months (pp. 119-27). Before deciding the matter, twenty-eight roll call 
votes were taken (seventeen in the Senate and eleven in the House), two 
continuing resolutions expired, and thousands of federal employees were 
threatened with delays in their paychecks. Debates over Hyde and other 
abortion-related riders remain contentious. In 1989, the appropriations 
process vvas delayed by skirmishes between the White House and Con-
gress over t4e sweep of abortion funding prohibitions. Abortion funding 
also proved contentious in 1993. On September 28, 1993, the Senate fol-
lowed the House's lead by maintaining restrictions on Medicaid funding 
of abortions. The 1993 funding restrictions allow for funding in cases of 
rape and incest, but otherwise retain the hard line adopted during the 
Bush administration. Pro-choice congressmen, however, remain un-
daunted, predicting ultimate victory when the issue is met in the national 
health care arena.140 The disruption caused by these battles demon-
strates the potentially debilitating impact of appropriations-based policy 
initiatives on Congress' ability to perform essential legislative functions. 
Abortion, finally, has transformed interest group advocacy before the 
Supreme Court. When !We was argued, ten amicus briefs were filed; 
when Webster was argued, that number had risen to seventy-eight (pp. 
212-27).141 Beyond interest group ftlings, the Justices today-as Justice 
Scalia bemoaned in Webster-are subject to "carts full of mail from the 
public, and streets full of demonstrations, urging us-their unelected 
and life-tenured judges ... -to follow the popular will."142 This ava-
lanche of partisanship, whether healthy or unhealthy, cannot be dis-
counted. It may well explain why Justice O'Connor began her Casey 
opinion with the admonition that "[l]iberty finds no refuge in a jurispru-
dence of doubt. "143 
Without question, inter-branch relations as well as the capacity of 
each branch to function effectively figure prominently in understanding 
abortion's impact on the American political system. The abortion dis-
pute also calls attention to the impact of single issue politics on the 
American governmental and political process. The appointment and 
confirmation of judicial nominees, the Hyde Amendment debates, and 
Supreme Court advocacy reveal the profound impact that the abortion 
dispute has had on the affected governmental actors. Abortion and 
American Politics makes clear that abortion figures prominently in appro-
priations policy (pp. 1 08-37) as well as judicial selection (pp. 173-85), 
but does not comment on these institutional concerns. Furthermore, 
Craig and O'Brien, while doing a fine job of explaining the origins and 
140. See Eric Pianin, Senate Keeps Medicaid Abortion limits, Wash. Post, Sept. 29, 
1993 at A-ll. 
141. See generally, Susan Behuniak-Long, Friendly Fire: Amici Curiae and Websterv. 
Reproductive Health Services, 74Judicature 261 (1991). 
142. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 535 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
143. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2803 (1992). 
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mobilizations of pro-choice and pro-life interest groups (pp. 35-71), do 
not commen~ on the relationship of single issue politics to governance 
issues. 
D. Elected Government Attitudes Toward the Judiciary 
The Supreme Court, while it does not have the "last word" on the 
abortion dispute, is a critical part of the dynamic that defines the reaches 
and limits of abortion rights. What role the Court plays in shaping abor-
tion rights is quite another matter. Common sense suggests a positive 
correlation between the respect accorded Roe and the judiciary's influ-
ence in defining the abortion issue. Along the same lines, common sense 
suggests a positive correlation between changes in abortion rates follow-
ing Roe and the decision's impact on people's lives. What then if abor-
tion rates have not changed after Roe or elected government has sought 
to undermine the decision through massive legislative and administrative 
resistance? Does this mean that Roe is inconsequential or that elected 
government does not take Court edicts seriously? These questions figure 
largely in the abortion dispute and the relevance of this dispute to an 
understanding of American political institutions. 
Roe clearly is consequential.144 By overturning forty-six state abor-
tion laws, Roe triggered unprecedented legislative and adininistrative ac-
tivism at both the federal and state level. Abartion and American Politics 
spends close to four hundred pages describing that activism; this review 
spends most of its pages calling attention to gaps that still remain in that 
descriptive summary. Roe also helps explain the rise in the number of 
legal abortions from 586,800 in 1972 to 1,553,900 in 1980.145 Roe's check-
ing of state power enabled market mechanisms to make relatively afforda-
ble abortions more readily available. For example, the number of women 
who could not obtain an abortion shrunk from over 1,000,000 in 1973 to 
less than 600,000 in 1977.146 In freeing the market (especially in author-
izing nonhospital abortions), Roe has spurred changes in access to abor-
tion in the most restrictive states (due to increased availability) and 
among poor women (due to increased affordability) .147 By affecting both 
144. For an argument that Roe was inconsequential, see Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 
229-46. For critiques of Rosenberg, see Peter H. Schuck, Public Law Litigation and Social 
Reform, 102Yale LJ. 1763,1777-80 (1993); Neal Devins,Judicial Matters, 80 Calif. L. Rev. 
1027, 1054-65 (1992) (book review). 
145. See Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 180. 
146. See Jacqueline D. Forrest et al., Abortion in the United States, 1976-1977, 10 
Fam. Plan. Persp. 271, 272 (1978). 
147. See Susan B. Hansen, State Implementation of Supreme Court Decisions: 
Abortion Rates since Roe v. Wade, 42J. Politics 372, 379 (1980). In addition, the abortion 
procedure has become safer as a consequence of Roe. From 1963 to 1973, the death rate 
for women as a result of abortion was roughly 5.7 per one million persons, with criminal 
procedures accounting for 75% of abortion deaths from 1940 to 1972. See id. at 378. 
After Roe, the number of women's deaths fell from pre-Roe figures of 57 per year to six in 
1974, three in 1976, and none in 1979. See Jesse H. Choper, Consequences of Supreme 
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abortion rates and the delivery of abortion services, the decision's practi-
cal impact helped catalyze pro-life efforts to politically nullify Roe. 
Supreme Court abortion decisions also offer telling evidence of 
elected government attitudes toward the Court. Rather than suggest cav-
alier disrespect for judicial authority by elected government, the vast ma-
jority of post-Roe action reveals that elected government generally 
respects Court decision-making, but is not afraid to test the boundaries of 
those decisions. To be sure, most elected government action has sought 
to limit abortion rights. At the same time, no federal and virtually no 
state action has directly challenged Supreme Court edicts. The Hyde 
Amendment, the AFLA, and family planning and fetal tissue regulations 
do not contradict Roe and its progeny. In contrast, proposals that sought 
to nullifY Roe-human life legislation, court-stripping, and constitutional 
amendment-were rejected by Congress. At the state level, only a handful 
of states have played a leadership role in enacting stringent abortion laws. 
Most states wait to see if the courts will approve these "challenger" state 
initiatives.148 Furthermore, most "challenger state action" is not clearly at 
odds with Court decisions, but tests the limits of these decisions. For ex-
ample, Roe did not explicitly address parental or spousal consent, public 
funding, hospital-only abortions, or waiting periods. State action on 
those subjects engages the judiciary in a dialogue on the sweep of abor-
tion rights; it does not necessarily challenge Court authority. 
The possibility that elected government output may not measure 
elected government preferences also suggests that too much should not 
be read into elected government resistance to Roe. Many elected officials 
were quietly pleased by Roe. John Hart Ely, for example, speaks of "[t]he 
sighs of relief as this particular albatross '\vas cut from the legislative and 
executive necks. "149 That an avalanche of abortion restrictions were en-
acted may only mean that legislators saw no downside in responding to 
pro-life interest groups because pro-choice concerns were content to 
leave it to the courts to protect their interests. In a sense, federal and 
state efforts to limit abortion rights paid homage to a judiciary who would 
toe the line and provide whatever constitutional protections were 
appropriate. 
Federal and state responses to Webster support this hypothesis. 
Rather than prompting a new wave of abortion regulation, legislative in-
ertia followed in Webster's wake. Many legislators would have preferred 
that the Court retain control over abortion and not return the issue to 
elected government. This reaction is not surprising. Knowing that pro-
Court Decisions Upholding Individual Constitutional Rights, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 185-86 
(1984). 
148. See generally Glen Halva-Neubauer, Abortion Policy in the Post-Webster Age, 20 
Publius 27, (1990) (assessing nexus between pre- and post-Webster state anti-abortion 
legislation). 
149. John H. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale 
LJ. 920, 947 (1973). 
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choice forces were "going to take names ·and kick ankles,"I5o Webster 
made right-to-life initiatives less likely to succeed. Instead, the Roe-cre-
ated "status quo" became the governing norm-despite the fact that Roe 
had earlier invalidated forty-six state laws. 
Elected government perceptions about the judicial role and the re-
spect owed Supreme Court decisions figure prominently in the story of 
abortion politics. The dialogue that takes place between the courts and 
federal and state government is highly nuanced. For example, rather 
than legislatively responding to family planning regulations before the 
Rust v. Sullivan decision, Congress deferred to the Supreme Court in the 
hopes that it could avoid the issue altogether. When the Court upheld 
the regulations, legislative repeal efforts targeted both the Court for its 
decision and the White House for its support of that decision.t5t One 
cannot simply conclude, as Craig and O'Brien do, that Supreme Court 
decisions are not final. Elected government has chosen certain types of 
limite9- responses and rejected more confrontational approaches. That is 
telling. It is also telling that federal and state officials, while supporting 
measures at odds with abortion rights, may well have preferred that the 
Court maintain a stranglehold on this issue. Abortion and American Politics, 
while very much concerned with Supreme Court decisions, does not fully 
explore the judiciary's role in the abortion dispute. Roe's impact on abor-
tion rights and elected government attitudes toward the Court are not 
given serious treatment. These issues, however, are critically important to 
the abortion dispute and the relevance of that dispute to American polit-
ical institutions. 
Craig and O'Brien are correct in choosing the abortion dispute as a 
lens through which to view American political institutions. Abortion, 
among other things, highlights the institutional tugs and pulls which help 
explain elected government decision-making, the seriousness with which 
elected government approaches constitutional interpretation, the impact 
of single issue politics on the political process, and elected government 
attitudes toward the judiciary. Abortion and American Politics, however, 
does not address these questions. It presents "an illustrative portrait ... 
of the American governmental and political process" (p. xv) without pro-
viding guidance to understanding the ramifications of that portrait. Per-
haps fearful that any commentary will shatter their efforts to provide a 
neutral account, Craig and O'Brien leave it to the reader to sort out the 
lessons of the abortion dispute. This Part, by utilizing examples found in 
the book, has suggested what some of those lessons might be. 
CONCLUSION 
Abortion and American Politics concludes with the observation that 
"[t]he abortion controversy will remain a driving force in and a reflection 
150. 135 Cong. Rec. H4928 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1989) (statem~nt of Rep. AuCoin). 
151. See 137 Cong. Rec. H10491-508 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1991). 
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of American politics" (p. 359). After two decades of elected branch re-
sponses to Rne and its progeny, Craig and O'Brien's prediction seems a 
near certainty. Indeed, it is hard to imagine abortion not playing a prom-
inent role in a Supreme Court appointment, a Medicaid appropriation, a 
presidential or gubernatorial· campaigu, or a host of other -policy issues. 
That the abortion dispute will persist is beyond cavil. All the same, 
the prospects of executive-legislativejudicial equilibrium on the abortion 
issue seem better today than at any time since the modern abortion con-
troversy emerged in the 1960s. At the federal level, no branch of govern-
ment is at war with another, and public policy generally matches public 
opinion. Unpopular Reagan-Bush initiatives on fetal tissue research and 
family planning counseling (p. 274) have been rejected and seem un-
likely to return. In contrast, abortion funding restrictions, which are ac-
ceptable to the courts and remain popular with Congress and much of 
the nation, persist. While the Clinton administration may disfavor these 
measures, that disapproval (at least for the time being) does not merit a 
fight over the funding ban. Likewise, with public opinion strongly sup-
portive of parental notification and consent laws (pp. 274-75), there is 
little mystery in Congress' failure to enact a Freedom of Choice Act that 
either curtails parental rights or guarantees federal funding for 
abortions. 
State action, although more variable, is generally stable. Louisiana, 
Utah, and Pennsylvania used Webster as a wedge to enact restrictive abor-
tion regulations. But these states are the exception, not the rule. Where 
states have acted, they have generally stayed within the prevailing norms 
of public opinion, symbolically codifying abortion rights and/ or enacting 
parental consent and notification provisions.152 In the vast majority of 
states, moreover, the pre-Webster "status quo". remains the governing 
standard. 
The Supreme Court seems quite comfortable with and is in· part re-
sponsible for the current state of affairs. Court doctrine has both shaped 
and been shaped by elected branch decision-making. Rne nationalized 
abortion rights at a time when state reform efforts, while on the rise, 
could not guarantee success. Twenty-one years later, as reflected in the 
failure of statutory and constitutional amendment repeal efforts as well as 
Casey's utilization of stare decisis to reaffirm Rne, the "durability of the 
"central holding of Rnt/'153 seems assured. The Court, however, has given 
way to elected branch counter-initiatives. Abortion funding restrictions 
have been upheld, some parental rights have been recognized, and the 
Court has left the development of administrative regulations to the polit-
ical process. Furthermore, while rejecting Reagan and Bush administra-
tion efforts to overturn Rne, the "undue burden" test advocated by 
152. See Halva-Neubauer, supra note 147, at 32-41. 
153. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 438 
(1983). 
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Solicitor General Rex Lee in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive 
Health, Inc. 154 seems the governing standard in state regulation cases.155 
The emerging equilibrium on abortion rights will not end this dis-
pute. Pro-choice and pro-life interests are too polarized and too powerful 
for there to be a common ground on abortion. Abortion battles, how-
ever, may prove less fierce and less destabilizing. With public opinion 
and public policy in rough accord, there is little reason for elected gov-
ernment or the courts to disrupt this awkward balance. 
Attaining an equilibrium, as Craig and O'Brien ably demonstrate, 
did require all branches and all levels of government to do battle with 
each other. This dynamic process has yielded a very nuanced, very deli-
cate (if not very deliberate) compromise. That this interactive process 
may appear a bit too much like the making of sausage helps explain Craig 
and O'Brien's characterization of the abortion dispute as an "illustrative 
... [and] disappointing reflection" (p. xv) of the American system. Never-
theless, our system is one, as Justice Ginsburg rightly observed at her con-
firmation hearing, where courts "do not guard constitutional rights 
alone. Courts share that profound responsibility with Congress, the Presi-
dent, the states, and the people. "156 
The abortion dispute makes clear that this dynamic is never-ending. 
A state of perpetual change, rather than being problematic, is the great-
est strength of this dynamic process. Changing circumstances demand 
that constitutional meaning not be too inflexible. Just as the judiciary 
leaves its mark on society, so society drives the agenda and decisions of 
the courts. "The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men," 
as Justice Cardozo put it, "do not tum aside in their course and pass the 
judges by."157 Elected government action, by treating the Constitution as 
part and parcel of everyday politics, ensures that constitutional doctrine 
and decision-makers operate within the confines of contemporary mores. 
Abortion and American Politics, despite its lapses, puts into focus this dy-
namic nature of constitutional decision-making. 
154. See 462 U.S. at 465 n.10 (O'Connor,]., dissenting). 
155. See supra note 59. 
156. Joan Biskupic, Ginsburg Stresses Value oflncremental Change, Wash. Post, July 
21, 1993, at A-6. 
157. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 168 (1921). 
